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SYNOPSIS

The General Strike of 1917 began on the 2nd

of August in the

workshops of the New South Wales Railways and Tramways Department on
the introduction of the Card System into the Service.

Although the dis-

pute was confined to the Department initially, it quickly spread by way
of "sympathy" strikes to include unionists in all major industries in
the State, and the major ports of the Commonwealth.

Through the use of

volunteer and "loyalist" labour and the assistance of the Federal Government and the employers, the Nationalist Government of New South Wales
was able to defeat the strikers and impose harsh settlements. The railway section of the strike ended on the 10th September, but coalminers,
seamen and watersiders did not return to work until mid-October.
The Nationalist Government of New South Wales was quick to brand
the strike a political "conspiracy", which set out to challenge the
authority of the recently elected "win-the-war" Nationalist Government.
It was alleged by the Nationalists that the conspiracy had been initiated
by the revolutionary I.W.W. and supported by all dissident and disloyal
elements of the labour movement, who had opposed conscription and were
intent on thwarting the war effort.

These sentiments were echoed by the

patriotic press and endorsed by W.M. Hughes and the Nationalists in
power in the Federal Parliament.

The Nationalists, to crush the Conspiracy,

and to assert the authority of their Government, set out to defeat the
unions totally and unconditionally.
Allegations that the strike was the result of a political conspiracy
within the labour movement were without foundation.

Amongst trade unionists

there was much discontent, as real wages fell and prices soared and other
grievances remained unheard.

The Card System was merely a catalyst for

direct action, since it created fears of impending deterioration in

XXI.

working conditions and further exploitation of labour.

Provocative

actions on the part of the Nationalist Government provided further fuel
for a potentially volatile industrial situation.
Counter-allegations were made by members of the labour movement to
the effect that the Nationalists, together with employers, had deliberately
engineered the strike to launch an attack on unionism.

Certainly, in

the violation of written agreements, first the Government and then the
employers engaged in wholesale victimisation, refusing to re-employ
workers in their old jobs and depriving them of their seniority and superannuation rights.

Old unions were de-registered and new Government or

employer-sponsored unions created in their place.

In a later Royal

Commission, several of the actions of the Government of New South Wales
were found to be legally questionable.

However, the notion of "conspiracy"

remains tenuous.
The evidence shows that the Nationalists and the employers effected
a savage attack on unionism, and the success of this probably influenced
the decision to hold another Conscription Referendum.

Whether or not

this was a pre-meditated attack or, in fact, a conspiracy, is difficult
to prove conclusively.

XV.

ABBREVIATIONS

A.R.T.S.A.

Amalgamated Railway and Tramway Services Association

A.S.E.

Amalgamated Society of Engineers

A.C.S.E.F.

Australasian Coal and Shale Employees' Federation

A.B.L.F.

Australian Builders' Labourers' Federation

A.W.U.

Australian Workers' Union

F.B.F.

Federated Bricklayers' Federation

F.E.D.F.A.

Federated Engine Drivers' and Firemen's Association

F.I.A.

Federation Iron Workers' Association

I.W.W.

Industrial Workers of the World

L.E.D.F.C.A.

Locomotive Engine Drivers, Firemen and Cleaners Association

M.L.A.

Member of the Legislative Assembly

M.L.C.

Member of,the Legislative Council

N.S.W.L.C.

New South Wales Labour Council

N.S.W.P.D.

New South Wales Parliamentary Debates

N.S.W.P.P.

New South Wales Parliamentary Papers

P.L.L.

Political Labour League

S.M.H.

Sydney Morning Herald

W.W.F.

Waterside Workers' Federation of Australia
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CHAPTER ONE

Prologue to the Strike
On the 2nd August 1917, several thousand employees of the New South
Wales Railways and Tramways Department laid down their tools and walked
off the job at the Randwick Depot in Sydney.

Thus began one of the most

disastrous strikes in the State's history, one which came close to
paralyzing the whole of New South Wales and also many services throughout
the Commonwealth.

E. J. Kavanagh, secretary of the New South Wales

Labour Council, described the strike as "The biggest upheaval ever
experienced in Australia".

The reason for the initial stoppage was the

introduction, without due notice, of the so-called "Card System", a
system which the Railway Commissioners claimed was simply an improved
costing system, needed to provide information about the cost of running
2
the service.
The men believed that the system was the Taylor Card
System, a system which caused "speeding-up" and was repudiated by trade
3
unionists in the United States.
The introduction of the time cards
affected, at least initially, only a few thousand members of the A.S.E.
The strike spread to include members of other railway unions, and then
to unionists in other industries throughout the Commonwealth.

Most

workers stopped in S5rmpathy with the railway men, whilst others were
drawn into the dispute by refusing to handle "black" goods and coal.
The strike was settled in two stages.

The railway men negotiated their

settlement on the 8th September, and the remaining of the strikers
returned some weeks later.

1.

Labour Council of New South Wales, Report, 31st December, 1917 p.l

2.

ibid, p.l

3.

ibid, p.l

4.

Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics, Labour and Industrial
Bganch Report No. 8, July 1918, p. 121. For further details of i-h.
of the spread of the strike, see Chapter 4
^^^^er aetaxls of the

In all, the strike involved about 97,500 workers in Australia, but
the bulk of these - some 77.350 - were in New South Wales, which was the
centre of the strike.

Similarly, the total loss of wages was £2,233,000;

the New South Wales figure being £1,780,000 and the total loss of working
5
days was 3,982,250, the loss in New South Wales being about 3,071,000.
Clearly then, while the strike did spread throughout Australia, New South
Wales was very much the centre, and it is on events in New South Wales
that this paper will concentrate.
The response of the New South Wales Nationalist Government was to
brand the strike as a conspiracy.
in the country.

This sentiment was echoed by others

Hughes, the Prime Minister, called the strike "the fruits

of a deliberate conspiracy".

Various employer organisations and the

press supported the Nationalist Government of New South Wales in its
denunciations of the strike. The Sydney Morning Herald, for example,
argued that the strike was
"a conspiracy against the State, in the first instance; and
coming in time of war, when co-operation and hearty goodwill
are essential to our taking a fair share of the fighting, it
becomes a conspiracy against the Empire".
The Employers' Federation deplored
"the action of the Unions in precipitating an unjustifiable
strike upon such an issue when the Empire is engaged in a
life and death struggle for the preservation of our
liberties".8
The Nationalists saw the strike as a conspiracy on two distinct levels.
As a party committed to a "win-the-war" policy the Nationalists regarded
the strike as an attempt to thwart the war effort, thereby aiding the
5. ibid.

All these figures are from the same source

6. W.M. Hughes in the "Argus", 13th November, 1917. Quoted in F.K.
Crowley, Modern Australia in Documents, Vol. 1 (Melbourne 1973).
7. S.M.H.

3rd August, 1917

8. S.M.H.

8th August, 1917

3.
enemies of the Empire.

The question of patriotism was used frequently

during the course of the strike.

Strikers were, in most cases,unjustly

accused of being disloyal and unpatriotic, and'the recipients of German
gold.

This was significant since many people identified Australian

nationalism with a sense of duty to the Empire, and looked unfavourably
on any act which could be considered to be betraying this obligation or
duty.

The Nationalists also stressed that the strike was a challenge

to representative Government in the State.

Fuller, the Acting Premier

of New South Wales, claimed that the strike was "in effect a rebellion
against the orderly government of the community" and that the Government
10
would not be dictated to by unionists.

On the 6th August, the Sydney

Morning Herald carried an editorial titled "Who is to Rule?", which
emphasised the need for the Government to govern, and as servants of
the piiblic, to refuse to surrender to union demands.
On the other hand, prominent figures in the labour movement were
equally insistent that the strike had been deliberately engineered by
the Nationalists and the employers, for the purpose of crushing the trade
union movement.

Together, they allegedly conspired to provoke the strike

in the hope of eroding existing working conditions and forcing conscription
on the workers.
The purpose of this paper is to examine these "conspiracy" aspects
of the strike. The term "conspiracy" is itself contentious, and with
its sinister connotations, is highly emotive.

It is important to note

that apart from the instances when leading trade union officials were
arrested an d charged with conspiracy, the word was not used in a formal
or legal sense.

9.

Instead, it was used for propaganda purposes, and care

V.G. Childe, How Labour Governs (Melbourne, 1964) p. 13

10. S.M.H.

7th August, 1917.

11. S.M.H. 6th August, 1917

4.
must be exercised in evaluating its use and implications.

The whole

concept of conspiracy in the case of the strike was an extension of
bitterness over the Conscription campaign the previous year.

Conscription

had polarised Australian society and had split the Australian Labor Party,
and these divisions would not be healed for the duration of the War.
The defeat of Conscription was a shattering blow to the pro-Conscriptionists
who felt that only with compulsory military service could Australia provide
enough recruits to aid Britain in the War. People like Hughes and Holman,
who were expelled from the Labor Party (since the Labor Party opposed
Conscription) blamed the defeat of Conscription on the "I.W.W., Sinn Feiners
and every disloyal section in Australia".
Throughout the Conscription campaign, the pro-Conscriptionists had
constantly attacked the I.W.W. and had made every effort to identify the
I.W.W. as the centre of the "No" campaign and to identify laboiir anti12
Conscriptionists with the I.W.W.

The I.W.W. was not only opposed to

the War. The organisation preached sabotage and "go-slowism" as methods
13
of fighting the capitalist system
and naturally enough were despised
by the establishment.

At the height of the Conscription campaign, twelve

leading fitures of the I.W.W. were arrested, tried and gaoled for crimes
ranging from arson and forgery, but the ordinal charges, "levying war
14
agaxnst Hxs Majesty", that is, treason, were not proven.

The attacks

on the I.W.W. continued after the defeat of the Conscription Bill, and
Hughes particularly tried to link the organisation with the labour movement and to discredit it.

15

12.

I. Turner, Industrial Labour and Politics (Canberra 1965)p. 112

13.

I. Turner, Sydney's Burning, (Sydney, 1967) p. 20.

14.

P.J. Rushton, "The Trial of the Sydney Twelve:
Labour History, No. 25, November, 1973, p. 56

15.

ibid. p. 56

The Original Charge,

5.
The newly formed Nationalist Party (an alliance of former Liberals
and expelled members of the Australian Labor Party) contested elections
in New South Wales in March 1917 and federally in May of 1917, and was
returned with a comfortable majority in each case. The respective leaders.
Messrs. Holman and Hughes, both used "win-the-war" platforms during the
elections and skillfully exploited the I.W.W. bogey while at the same
time attacking former colleagues.

For example, a Nationalist election

poster tried to link A.W. Buckley, the Labor candidate for Surrey Hills,
who was to play an important role in the strike, with the I.W.W.:
"To show his belief in, and adherence to, the I.W.W.
gospel of 'go slow', burning down buildings and other
methods of destruction, Mr. Buckley moved at a meeting
of the executive of the Railway and Tramway Employees'
Association last year for a resolution to have I.W.W.
speakers to attend general meetings and preach sabotage.
This establishes conclusively that the Political Labour
League and the I.W.W. are allied in this election contest.
Unionists I Are you going to stand behind an organisation
that burns down buildings and throws thousands of workers
out of employment?
Citizens! Are you going to vote for an agent of anarchy
and incendiarism?
Most of the I.W.W. members bear suspiciously foreign names.
They have plenty of money. Where does it come
from? Who pays these men to give their lives and liberty
in burning down factories? Is it the Kaiser's American
Agents?" 16
The election victory for the Nationalists was later used as an explanation
for the alleged conspiracy behind the strike. Hughes stressed that the
real cause of the strike was political rather than industrial:

16.

Election Bill 1917 for the Nationalist Party.
Library, Sydney.

From the Mitchell

6.
"It is an attempt on the part of those responsible for the
debacle of the 5th of May, when the great Labour Movement
of Australia was split on the rocks, to get even with
their opponents, to prevent those to whom the electors
entrusted the reins of Government from carrying out their
duty". 17
In fact, throughout the strike, the Nationalists in the Federal Parliament
and in New South Wales, constantly stressed that the strike was politically
motivated, rather than industrially.

Attempts to link the I.W.W. and the

P.L.L. continued right up to the strike.

Mr. Weaver, speaking in the

Legislative Assembly on the 26th July, commented that there existed
between the I.W.W. and the P.L.L. "an alliance of thought and an extra18
ordinarily sjrmpathetic outlook".
In this scenario of conflict that had been simmering since the
Conscription campaign, the 1917 Strike erupted. The New South Wales
Government's claims that the strike was a conspiracy masterminded by the
I.W.W., that the strike was a threat to the war effort and that the
strikers were disloyal was heard by S3rmpathetic ears.

The Nationalists

of New South Wales were very much a pro-Hughes party, supporting Conscription
and his other war policies.

It is probable that they were convinced that

Hughes would assist in any strong action taken against the trade union
movement at this time for the purpose of weeding out the I.W.W. saboteurs
and shirkers. The term "shirkers", used by the Nationalists throughout
the strike, is an interesting one. It was applied to those men who did
not give full effort in their work, (that is, slow workers), but also
referred to those who did not support their country at war (that is, who
did not enlist).

From the outset, the Nationalist Government of New

South Wales demonstrated its determination to defeat the strike totally.
17. W. M. Hughes, Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Vol. LXXXIII
(second session) p. 1758
18. N.S.W.P.P. (Second Series) Sessions 1917-18, Vol. LXVII pp. 224-225.

7.
There is little evidence to support the charge that the strike was
a conspiracy on the part of the labour movement. With the passage of
the Unlawful Associations Act, and later the Amendment, and the I.W.W.
trials of 1916, most prominent I.W.W. men were in prison where they were
certainly in no position to plan any such extensive action.

Perhaps

earlier I.W.W. agitation for general strikes and even the dream of
amalgamating all unions into the One Big Union, gave a justification to
the Government's claims. However, the evidence points to the strike
being a spontaneous upheaval, supported by many workers discontented with
existing economic and social conditions. E. J. Kavanagh, M.L.C. and
spokesman for the Unions' Defence Committee, tried to keep the strike
within the bounds of an industrial dispute while Mr. Hughes and Mr. Fuller
decried it as being politically motivated.

He stressed that it was

19
"purely an industrial matter, and had nothing to do with politics".
He even chided members of the Labor Party for trying to make political
capital from the strike.
Allegations by members of the labour movement that the Nationalist
Government of New South Wales, with the support of Hughes and the employers
used the strike to attempt to crush trade unionism and to discredit the
whole labour movement, also need examining.

It was suggested that the

Nationalists themselves had engaged in a conspiracy with the employers to
achieve this.

Evidence exists which seems to point to a conspiracy,

but a number of weaknesses exist in this argument, and these will be
discussed later. But certainly, the Government of New South Wales, by
abetting the wholesale victimisation that took place after the strike,
by flagrantly violating written agreements, seemed to be determined to
destroy and discredit the labour movement. Hughes too showed his
vindictiveness with his decisive role in the strike, and earned himself

19.

A.M.H.

8th August, 1917,

20
some chastisement from Justice Higgins.

Motives for the actions of

the Nationalists are discussed in a later chapter, but it is necessary
to point out a basic feature of Nationalist Party thinking.

The Party was

created out of a common desire to win the war and consisted of many men
who, because of their adherence to the view that Conscription was necessary,
were forced to leave the Labor Party.

Gollan makes the point that these

Conscriptionists "were left licking their wounds, and (were) determined
not to permit another ma]or trade union victory".

21

Thus, when the strike

began,
"The Government of New South Wales was spoiling for a
fight which might avenge the Conscription defeat and
restore the authority of the Government". 22
With the determination to win the war still evident, and the memories
of the lost Conscription campaign still present, the Nationalists approached
the strike with a total victory in mind.

20.

H.B. Higgins, A New Province for Law and Order (London, 1968)
p. 55. Higgins suggested that Hughes in wanting to de-register
the W.W.F. was merely seeking ven^ance and not justice.

21.

R. Gollan The Coal Miners of New South Wales (Melbourne, 1963) p. 148

22.

ibid.

p. 148.

9.
CHAPTER TWO
The Genesis of the Card System and Its Effects
The primary cause of the Strike was the introduction into the workshops of the New South Wales Railway and Tramways Department of the
so-called "Card System".

The refusal of the railway men to accept the

Card System, and the insistence of the Commissioners in retaining it
promoted the complaint that led to the Strike.

The conflict surrounding

the Card System assumed proportions that were excessive,for the issue
was not, on the surface, contentious and the problems not insoluble. Yet
both sides, the Unions and the Railway Commissioners and the Government,
chose to magnify this dispute, to make a fighting stand, and this intransigence sparked off the disastrous Strike.

The problem is to establish

why the Card System was introduced at this time, indeed, why at all, and
then what effect it had on the ensuing events.
The Card System was introduced ostensibly as a costing system, that
is, for determining the cost of running the service as compared with the
return.

The Commissioners felt that some costing system was needed in

view of the fact that the Department's pre-war profits to the value of
£211,047 had by 1917 fallen to a deficit of some £412,253 with the Railways Division suffering the greatest losses.
reasons for this.

There were a number of

In his 1915 Report, the Chief Commissioner pointed out

that earnings had fallen due to the outbreak of war, a bad drought in
late 1914 which reduced the need for transportation of wheat and cattle,
2
and a general decrease in business activity.
Mounting costs and interest

1.

New South Wales Government Railways and Tramways - Reports of the
Chief Commissioner, N.S.W. P.P. 1914-1917. See Appendix A for
additional figures.

2.

Reports of Chief Commission for 1915, N.S.W.P.P. 4th Session, Vol. 6,
1915-1916, p.5

10.
rates, free transport of war materials and troops and work in the manufacture
of munitions at the Eveleigh and Randwick workshops also greatly added to
3
the costs.
The Commissioner, it seems, felt that the problem lay with
increases in wages which, he felt, the Department could not absorb, and
consequently made an application to the Court of Industrial Arbitration
for the suspension of such clauses of the awards of Wages Boards that
provided for periodical pay rises to salaried officers and wages staff.
Although the application was dismissed, it showed that the Commissioners
were concerned with mounting costs,5 and that they were prepared to
limit these where possible.
It was in 1915 that I.W.W. posters and slogans first began appearing
in the Department workshops, and caused much apprehension to the
Commissioners.

The I.W.W. called for "slow work" since this would mean

employment for fellow workers. A number of connections were established
between individuals in the Railway workshops and the I.W.W. Buckley, as
previously shown, was involved; William Teen, one of the I.W.W. twelve,
7
was on the council of A.R.T.S.A. but was dismxssed.
The Commxssloners,

3.

Reports of Chief Commissioner 1914-1917. See particularly N.S.W. P.P.
5th Session, Vol. 4, p. 529.

4.

Report of Chief Commissioner 1915, N.S.W.P.P., 4th Session, Vol. 5. p.6

5.

In all reports during the war years, wage rises were cited as primary
causes of increased expenditure.

6.

Mr. Cargill (solicitor for the Department), Minutes of Evidence, Royal
Commission of Inquiry in the Job and Time Cards System in the Railway
and Tramway Workshops, H.R. Curlewis presiding. N.S.W.P.P. Vol. 6,
1918, p.2.

7.

Minutes A.R.T.S.A. April/May 1916. According to Tom Barker, another
of the I.W.W. Twelve, Tom Glynn had worked on the trams in Sydney, but
this appears to have been at an earlier time. See E.C. Fry Tom Barker
and the I.W.W. (Canberra, 1965) p. 16.

11.
fearing that the I.W.W. propaganda and principles would take firm root
in the workshops, dismissed or suspended any workers thought to be holding
I.W.W. ideas. Later, upon signing declarations disclaiming any S5niipathy
with the I.W.W. or their ideas, they were reinstated.

There is no

doubt that I.W.W. propaganda was influential to a degree, but the extent
was often exaggerated by the opponents of the I.W.W.

Sympathy with the

I.W.W. appeared to be more in line with working class solidarity, than
with the ideology of the I.W.W.

For example, the council of A.R.T.S.A.

in December 1915 after the I.W.W. trials, passed a resolution stating
that.
"Whilst in total disagreement with the tactics and methods
of the I.W.W. this council records an emphatic protest
against the cruel and relentless persecution to which its
members are subjected".9
Yet Mr. Eraser, who became Chief Commissioner in 1917, was still concerned
that I.W.W. ideas had taken root in the workshops. He complained that
he had himself seen men who were going through the motions of working but
, . 10
producxng nothxng.
In January 1917, while discussing slow work in the
workshops, Fraser noted that
"There has been evidence of late that there is in every industry
a section of the workers who favour, for their own ends,
industrial ferment and disorder, and whose every effort is
constantly bent to produce these conditions ... 'Work slowly',
'stop work', 'do what damage you can' are mottoes they endeavour
to instill". 11
Commenting, Tom Barker replied:
"At the present rate ... the boss will be in dungarees about
1955 ... Slowing down is a more effective way of dealing with
the working class nightmare of unemployment than soup
kitchens and unemployment parades". 12

8.

Direct Action 6th January, 1917

9.

Minutes, the Amalgamated Railway and Tramway Services Association,
12th December, 1916.

10. Fraser, in Curlewis Royal Commission, Minutes of Evidence, p.9
11. New South Wales Railway and Tramway Budget (Official organ of the
New South Wales Government Railways and Tramways Institute) March 1
1917, p.231 (See Appendix B for Eraser's figures)
12. Direct Action,

22nd January, 1917

12.
The connection between the I.W.W. and the Railway workshops is of
fundamental importance in understanding subsequent events. The Commissioners were obviously concerned at I.W.W. influence in their workshops
and associated the losses sustained in the service with this influence.
The introduction of the Card System was partly the result of this
concern, for the Commissioners were determined to weed out unproductive
workers, and a costing system such as the one proposed in 1917 would
serve this purpose.
Systems of costing and time-keeping were not uncommon in private
industries throughout the country and existed in some Government enterprises, the Railways and Tramways Department being one. Up until the
outbreak of the war, and some months later, the workmen in the Railways
service had made their own record of the time occupied and other details
of the job they were engaged in. The details were set out in sheets
and then passed on to time clerks who recorded the information on record
13
sheets.

The system proved to be unsatisfactory, since the men gave

only grudging support and costing could not be accurately determined. As
a consequence, in June 1916, a system of Cards was introduced which did
not differ greatly from the system that had previously existed.

Again

it was opposed by the workmen because each man had the duty of entering
on his own card the time occupied in doing each job given to him by the
foreman, and the men generally opposed the clerical work involved.

14

After a good deal of protest from the Labor Minister for Railways, the

13.

Mr. Cargill, Minutes of Evidence, Curlewis Commission, p.2.

14.

The New South Wales Strike Crisis, 1917. Report prepared by the
Industrial Commissioner, J.B. Holme.

Supplement to New South Wales

Industrial Gazette, Vol. XIII, No. 2, 1918, p.5a.

13.
15
the system was withdrawn.

The Chief Commissioner, however, stressed that

the system was being withdrawn only temporarily until a better system was
developed.

In addition, an agreement was reached between the men and the

Commissioners that there would be no changes made to working conditions
during the course of the war, the men in return promising to avoid
16
industrial action.
On July 20th, 1917, a new Card System was introduced into the workshops.

It differed only slightly from the one introduced a year earlier.

Instead of the workmen recording their own times, sub-foremen would be
engaged whose duties included checking the work and recording the time
taken by men over each particular job.

The system was introduced without

notice and immediately aroused a great deal of opposition.
of this move by the Commissioners was significant.

The timing

The Cards were intro-

duced shortly after a State election had swept the Nationalist Party to
power, the Commissioners no doubt anticipating less interference over
this matter from a more conservative ministry.

Nevertheless, in the light

of past opposition from the men regarding the introduction of any card
system, the Commissioners must have expected trouble, and trouble they
got.
The Card System introduced in July 1917 was essentially an information system.

The time taken by each workman over a particular job would

be recorded on cards and this information would enable the Commissioners
to determine costs, output, and to work out where improvements could be
carried out.

It would also, of course, isolate slow workers, and Fraser,

15.

Minutes, A.R.T.S.A. 21st June, 1916.

16.

Mr. Fuller later denied that this agreement was reached, stating
that "no such undertaking was ever given, but there was an implied
Understanding that wages, hours of employment, overtime rates, and
privileges should not be interfered with during the war..." (Daily
Telegraph, 27th August, 1917). Mr. Fraser too denied that any such
.J. L.

^ ^ e n reached, but without qualification, SMH 3rd August,1917

14.
conscious of I.W.W. sympathies in the workshops, no doubt intended to
use this information to rid the service of any surviving I.W.W. elements.
It is difficult to establish positively whether or not the introduction
of the Card System was a deliberately provocative action on the part of
the Commissioners.

Senator O'Keefe doubted that it was even necessary

17
to introduce the Card System at all.

Certainly, the workmen in the

service took it as such, as subsequent actions confirm.
On the 27th July, a deputation consisting of Mr. Padgen, the
president of the Amalgamated Society of Engineers, and Mr. Dengate, an
organiser with that union, met with the Railway Commissioners to air the
grievances of the men regarding the Card System.

They told the Commiss-

ioners that the men feared the Card System was a "speeding up" system.
similar to the Taylor System being used in the Ford workshop in America.

18

The Taylor System relied on sub-foremen taking charge of a group of workmen
and timing them during the performance of a job.

The time would be judged

against the fastest workmen and this would be more or less taken as the
mean.

It was generally,throughout the world, a most unpopular system

19
amongst workers.

The men feared they would be forced to speed-up too.

The appointment of forty-five new sub-foremen at Randwick, and eighty at
Eveleigh seemed to confirm in the men's eyes that it was the Taylor System
that the Commissioners were in fact

introducing.

20

The Chief Commissioner's

reply was that it was not a system of "speeding-up" and that it would not
affect the average worker only the wilfully slow one.
17.

21

This poxnt was

This was as a response to claims made by Mr. Lucy, the Chief Mechanical
Engineer at the Eveleigh Workshops before the Card System was introduced,
that he was satisfied that he was getting an efficient return for the
expenditure outlaid.

See Appendix C for details.

18.

Minutes of the Meeting with the Deputation, Curlewis Commission, p.75.

19.

From a manifesto of Unions' Defence Committee, in Daily Telegraph
13th August, 1917.

20.

From Deputation, Curlewis Commission, p. 75

21.

ibid. p.78
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an important one in both the Government's and Commissioner's justification
of the Card System.

They both continually stressed that the "honest work-

men", or the workman who did a fair day's work, should have nothing to fear
from the Card System.

The slow worker would be found out and dismissed.

The Chief Commissioner informed the second deputation:
"There are workers still
in the public interest,
and those shirkers will
ministration remains as
State". 22

in the Department who should be,
eliminated from State employment,
be eliminated if the present adthe Railway Administration of the

The matter of so-called "speeding up" raised a number of issues. If,
for example, a workman did work faster, to what degree would safety be
considered?

Or, how well could he perform his task?

The men felt that

fast work would mean greater danger to themselves and unsatisfactory
completion of jobs.
work.
fault.

In both cases, they could find themselves out of

Or else, a worker could be cited for slow work when it was not his
For example, in all the workshops, there was, according to the

men, a severe shortage of tools and equipment which was responsible for
23
an enormous loss of time.

Men had to wait for tools or materials and

sometimes even their jobs, and an unsympathetic foreman would regard this
as idleness.

In an orderly workshop, such waste would not occur and there

would be no need for a Card System.

The men had as many complaints

regarding efficiency in the service as did the Commissioners.

The Manifesto

of 11th August noted:
"There has always been a dearth of small hand tools, yet
there are machines at Eveleigh which cost hundreds of
pounds that have never earned as many pence. New machines
have never done a day's work - scrap. Who ordered these
machines, and who paid for them?" 24

22.

J. Fraser during the Second Deputation headed by E. J. Kavanagh,
Curlewis Commission, p.81.

23.

Manifesto of Unions' Defence Committee, 11th August, 1917. Quoted in
J.B. Holme, The NS.W. Strike Crisis 1917, p.95a

24.

ibid. p.95a
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Contradicting the Chief Commissioner's statements about the quantity of
work being performed by the men, the Manifesto continued:
"Much is heard about slow work, but does the public know
that it takes a fortnight under favourable circumstances
for a paper from an employee to reach the Chief Mechanical
Engineer - a distance of about three hundred yards? It
often takes a fortnight for some clerk to put a pencil
mark on it without ever reaching its destination." 25
This seems to indicate that there was genuine dissatisfaction amongst the
men with the way the service was being run.

It was not simply a case of

the men being unproductive.
Mr. Padgen, at the Deputation, claimed that men could be accused
under the Card System of slow work at times when it was not their fault,
for example, when waiting for tools, materials, and so on.26

This could

particularly be the case if the sub-foreman recording the times was
unsympathetic or unscrupulous.

Since the cards were to be secret, the

men would not know exactly how they were being treated.
On the 31st, a second deputation met with the Railway Commissioners
and was headed this time by Mr. E. J. Kavanagh, Secretary of the New South
Wales Labour Council. A meeting the night before of fourteen unions
involved had endorsed the Deputation, in the hope that its members could
xnduce the Commissioners

to withdraw the Card System.27 The Railway

Commissions re-affirmed their commitment, claiming that it was not a system
of "speeding up", but simply an improvement on earlier costing systems,
and that the honest worker would have nothing to fear.

They made a concession

in agreeing to allow the men to inspect and initial their own cards.

They

emphasised that the system would not be withdrawn under any circumstances.

25. ibid. p. 95a
26. Padgen, Curlewis Commission, p. 75
27. These are the unions that were immediately affected by the introduction
of the Card System.

See Appendix D.
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E. J. Kavanagh summed up the feelings of the men at the time of the Curlewis
Commission.

He said the men regarded the Card System as the "thin edge

of the wedge - the first installment of the Taylor Card System in
28
America".

He complained thafthe Commissioners were attempting to

introduce the most up-to-date costing system in the world to the most
out-of-date workshops in the world".

29

Generally, he reported that it

was not so much the Card System itself but how it could be used.

Mr. Justice

Curlewis in his Royal Commission on the Cards in 1918 did not agree that
time cards necessarily were evil but he did say that "there can be no
doubt that the system is one which in the hands of an unscrupulous employer,
30
is capable of afflicting grave hardships".
He stressed that abuses
could take place and great vigilance was needed to see that these abuses
did not take place. Nevertheless, at the time of the Deputation, the
Commissioners argued that the men had presented no case as to why the Cards
should be withdrawn, that their suspicions were without basis, and the
Cards would not be withdrawn.
A meeting of the fourteen unions involved in the dispute was held
on the night of the 31st and it re-affirmed a resolution that had been made
the night before that "... an ultimatum be issued to the Government that
unless the Card System is withdrawn by next Thursday, the whole of the
unions concerned will stop work".

28.

31

This ultimatum was delivered to both

Curlewis Commission, p. 23. This, the men alleged, was also the
beginning of "piece work".

Fraser initially denied this but at the

Curlewis Commission he conceded that "the bonus system is undoubtedly
the proper system to introduce in any workshop", ibid. p.81-82.
29.

ibid. p.23

30.

ibid. p. 156

31.

S.M.H.

1st August, 1917.
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the Railway Commissioners and the Government on the following day.
Predictably, neither the Commissioners nor the Government would bow to
the ultimatum.

Late attempts were made, particularly by the leader of

the Opposition, Mr. John Storey, to bring about a settlement, but a late
night conference between the disputing parties failed to resolve the issue.
Mr. Fuller appealed to the unionists to avoid a strike and stated
"If the precipitate action of the unionists concerned
results in a strike, I can only say in conclusion,
that the Government will stand by every loyal workman.
The matter is not a legitimate subject for industrial
dispute, and the workmen who respond to call to national
service will receive ample protection and reward for
their action, whatever the consequences may be". 33
This prophetic pronouncement suggests that the Government had already
decided before the Strike that they were going to fight the unions to
the finish, and how it was going to be done.

Only the final action was

now needed.
On the following morning, the 2nd August, members of the Amalgamated
Society of Engineers, upon finding that the Cards had not been withdrawn,
stopped work at the Randwick and Eveleigh workshops.

Their example was

followed by fellow members in other workshops in Sydney and the State.

34

Some five thousand members stopped that day, starting a long and bitter
struggle between the Unions and the Nationalist Government of New South
Wales.

The Card System was the catalyst.

The intransigence of both

sides made some sort of industrial collision likely.

Moderation was really

lacking at a time when it was most needed and this meant that any attempt
to remedy the situation was doomed to fail.

32.

S.M.H. 2nd August, 1917

33.

S.M.H. 2nd August, 1917

34.

J.B. Holme, The N.S.W. Strike Crisis 1917, pp.7a, 8a.

32
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CHAPTER THREE

Conspiracy and the Causes of the Strike
After the strike broke out, the Government made it very clear what
their attitude was regarding its causes. On Friday, 3rd August, the
Acting Premier, Mr. Fuller, issued a statement which alleged that the
Government suspected some type of political conspiracy led by undesirable
elements in the labour movement, and which also indicated that the Government was prepared to make its stand on this issue of the Card System.
Fuller claimed that
"We are not dealing with a revolt of workmen against
oppressive conditions. We are dealing with Trades
Unionism for the time being under the control of
irresponsible and dangerous men who, for politbal
reasons, have determined to plunge and keep the community in a state of industrial ferment ... There can
be no compromise on the part of the Government, when
an issue of this kind is raised. The time has come
for the people of this State to take their stand
against those extremists who have for a long time been
conspiring against the public interest and who have
been responsible for the industrial ferment which has
disgraced this State since the beginning of the war ., nl
Later, in a proclamation to the people of New South Wales, Fuller reiterated
the identity of those whom his Government suspected were behind the strike.
"The enemies of Britain and her Allies have succeeded in
plunging Australia into a General Strike. For the time
being, they have crippled our country's efforts to assist
in the Great War.
At the back of this strike lurk the I.W.W and the exponents of Direct Action.
Without realising it, many Trades Unions have become the
tools of Disloyalists and Revolutionaries.
A great conspiracy has been fermenting for the past two
years to prevent Australia rendering further assistance
to Britain and her Allies.
Every striker is playing a game for Disloyalists.
Every striker is singing from day to day the hymns of
the I.W.W. and marching to their music". 2
1.

S.M.H. Friday, August 3rd, 1917.

2.

This statement appeared as an advertisement in the Sunday Sun and the
Sunday Times on the 12th August, 1917. Here, it is taken from J.B.
Holme, The N.S.W. Strike Crisis 1917.
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Finally, during a meeting with a deputation from the wives of the
strikers on the 9th August, Mr. Fuller again stressed his position and
that of his Government:
"This is not a revolt against the Card System, but
against the Nationalist Government ... I say plainly
that they are being led by men who are not only
enemies of this Government, but who are friends of
the enemies of the Empire who would take away all
your privileges, devastate your homes, and make you
the servile slaves of the Kaiser, instead of keeping
you a free people under the flag of Old England", 3
It was probably predictable that the Nationalist Government of New
South Wales would react to the strike in these terms. The I.W.W. had become
a bogey even before the Nationalist Party had been formed, and had later
been employed skillfully and successfully by that Party in the 1917 State
and Federal elections.

The tactic of branding the strikers as "disloyalists",

agents of the Kaiser, traitors, and generally assisting the German war
effort, also was not novel, and was certainly consistent with the character of the Nationalist Party.

Since the difficult days of the Conscription

debates and referendum a year earlier, members of that Party had been
obsessed with the apparent presence of enemy agents on Australian soil.
Essentially a "win-the-war" Party, the Nationalists were ready to vent
their outrage on anything or anyone that stood in the way of the war
effort.

They believed that the strike, by holding up transport and the

manufacture of materials necessary for war, did hold back the war effort.
This is largely why the Nationalists were by no means confined to the
State Party.

Hughes echoes these sentiments when he said, in retrospect,

after the event;

3,

S.M.H.

11th August, 1917.
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"The recent strike, the most serious in the history of
Australia, was the fruits of a deliberate conspiracy
for this purpose. It was engineered by the same men who
had driven out of the Labour movement every man who
dared to put his country, in the hour of its greatest
peril, before his Party, and its mean and petty interests.
It was supported by the I.W.W., by Sinn Fein, by every
disloyal section in Australia". 4
This belief is what caused Hughes to side with the Nationalists in New
South Wales so decisively in the strike.
It was an easy step for the Nationalists to combine the threat of the
I.W.W. and the threat that the strike offered to the war effort and allege
a conspiracy.

But was it valid?

The evidence suggests that it was not.

By August, 1917, the I.W.W. barely existed.
5

The Unlawful Associations

Act of 1916 had broken the back of the organisation, and the amendments
to the Act in July of 1917 enabled the police to mop up remaining elements.
The Government overestimated the direct influence that the I.W.W. had on
the trade unions which clearly, at this time, could only have been limited.
They also overestimated the influence of the officers of the various
unions over their members and the cohesion of the trade union movement
generally.

Fuller repeatedly insisted that the men were influenced by

their leaders, and challenged the unions to hold ballots to determine if
they should stay out on strike or not.
4.

From the "Argus", Melbourne, 13th November, 1917. Quoted in F.K. Crowley,
Modern Australia in Documents, Vol. 1 (Melbourne, 1973) p. 289.

5. This Act had been passed because Hughes was not satisfied that the
existing legislation, the War Precautions Act, could effectively deal
with the I.W.W.

The new Act gave him much wider powers. See G. Saw^^er

Australian Politics and Law 1901-1929 (Melbourne, 1972) p.135.

It is

significant that although Hughes tried to link the I.W.W. with the
labour movement, the new Act was not opposed by Labor members in the
House, Tudor declared that he was opposed to "go-slow, sabotage, murder,
arson, which seemed to be the policies of the I.W.W."
op. cit. p.149
6.

Daily Telegraph, 14th August, 1917.

See Childe,
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In fact, union leaders had less control over the strikers than the
Government thought.

The initial opposition to the Card System, for example,

came from the men rather than their leaders. At the second deputation
to the Railway Commissioners on the 31st July, E.J. Kavanagh suggested that
the Commissioners' terms be put to the men with a view to accepting them,
but others, notably Padgen and Dengate, claimed that, in the light of their
7
xnstructions, they knew the terms would not be accepted.
During the early
part of the strike, the Defence Committee, acting on behalf of the
strikers, found themselves swamped with representatives of the various
unions and found it difficult to determine a uniform policy on which to
g
fight the strike.

Kavanagh demonstrated the problem faced by the

Defence Committee and the determination of the rank-and-file unionists
when he reported that the difficulty was not in getting them to come out,
9
but xn keeping them in.
The conservative daily paper, the Sydney Morning
Herald was concerned that
"... the men have acted in opposition to the advice of
their representatives. The union leadership have been
dragged along instead of keeping their place in the van,
and in this latest development of mischief, it looks as
though the restraining influence of men feeling the
responsibility of power and loath to hurry their unions
into collision with the Government was of little value
at the last moment". 10
H.E. Boote, editor of the Worker, who stressed the role of the rank-and-file
unionists in the strike, wrote:

7.

Curlewis Commission, Appendix J.l "Minutes of Evidence

8.

K.D. Buckley The Amalgamated Engineers in Australia 1852-1920
(Canberra 1970) p. 264.

9.

Labour Council of New South Wales Report, The Railway Strike 1917, p.l,

10. S.M.H. 10th August, 1917.
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"I never hoped to see the workers so united. This revolt
against Government ^yranny is a spontaneous manifestation
of feeling. The men took matters into their own hands.
The officers had nothing to do but voice the demands of the
rank-and-file".11
When these statements are considered with reference to the coixrse of
events during the strike, it is plain that any notion of union leadership
dominating the course of events and fomenting some kind of "conspiracy"
was at best, an exaggeration; at worst, it was false.
While it is necessary to examine the Government's contention that the
strike was a result of a conspiracy of extremists, it would be erroneous
to accept the position that the introduction of the Card System was the
sole cause of the strike.

It is true that it was the Card System that

sparked off the strike, but there were other significant underlying
currents of discontent throughout the country's workforce.

This is a

particularly important point, since neither side in the strike accepted
that the Card System was the real cause of the strike.

Mr. Dengate,

during the deputation to the Railway Commissioners, claimed that if the
Commissioners had introduced the Card System quietly there would have
12
been no trouble at all.

Mr. Claude Thompson, secretary of A.R.T.S.A.,

insisted that
"had the dispute been confined to the time card system,
there would have been no general cessation of work on
the part of the Amalgamated members, except such as
are employed in Railway and Tramway workshops". 13
The Striker carried an article which said:

11.

The Worker 16th August, 1917

12.

Dengate, Curlewis Commission, Appendix J, Minutes of Evidence.

13.

Statement by Claude Thompson, authorised by the Unions' Defence
Committee, Sydney, 13th August, 1917.
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"No sane man believes that it is the Card System they
are troubling about; that is only the thin end of the
wedge intended to split unionism, and bring about a
general reduction in wages, longer hours, and more
degrading conditions of labour". 14
It has already been demonstrated that the Government believed that a
conspiracy was behind the strike, and not really the Card System.
Certainly, there was discontent in the workforce which no doubt contributed to the men's willingness to strike and this discontent needs to be
examined.
From the outset of the war, it was obvious that many workers would
have to face greater hardships than they had before. War and drought
immediately brought about an increase in the price of meat and flour. For
example, between July 1914 and May 1915 in Melbourne, the price of food and
groceries in the Commonwealth rose from 22/lld. to 25/5d. (based on a
weighted average in shillings and pence) and in Sydney from 23/ld. to
15
30/lOd.

Rents rose as well in this period.

Overall, the cost of

living rose dramatically, particularly in Sydney; and during the whole
period of the war. New South Wales was by the most expensive State to
1 fi

live in.
prices.

Wages rose too, but hardly in proportion to the rise in

The average weekly wage rose from 55/3d. in June 1914, to 74/lld.

in December 1919 for male workers; and from 27/2d. to 37/ld. for female
1n

workers.

1 g

In real terms, however, wages actually decreased.

In the

early years of the war, unemployment figures showed tha.t 6.5% of workers

14.

The Striker, issued by the authority of the Unions' Defence Committee
Sydney, 13th August, 1917.

15.

From N.S.W. Industrial Gazette Vol. XIII, No. 3, 1918. See Appendix E
for figures

16.

Scott, op. cit. p. 634

17.

ibid. p. 634

18.

See Table, Appendix F.

25.
who were union members were unemployed.
19
9.3% in 1915.

This rose to 8.3% in 1914, and

Figures remained relatively high for the remainder of

the war period.
These figures can be attributed partially to a general fluctuation
caused by the outbreak of the war, which affected trade, finance available
for public expenditure, the cost of the war effort, and so on.

Workers,

however, attributed this to war-time profiteering by the capitalists.
Probably, all these factors contributed to the worsening economic situation.
but certainly it was the workers who suffered most.

They continued to be

denied by wage freezes, while prices remained high.

Mr. Justice Powers

in the judgement of the New South Wales Court of Industrial Arbitration
in its inquiries into the cost of living and the minimum wage, told the
workers what was expected of them:
"I realise that people cannot live in these days in
reasonable comfort on the living wage prescribed if they
attempt to maintain the same regimen as in the days before
the war and drought. If clothing goes up in price,
ordinary people are most careful of what they possess
and of new purchases. If butter goes up to a high price,
other things are used in its place. If meat goes up in
price, less is used". 20
He went on to reflect what was the accepted view of governments and
employers that "important reasons for the rising costs of prices were
the high incidence of strikes, industrial sabotage and go-slow, and for
21
these, workers were themselves responsible.
Workers could have had
little joy from words like these.
19. Commonwealth Labour Reports. Quoted from I. Turner, Industrial Labour
and Politics, (Canberra 1965) p. 253. See Appendix G for additional
figures.
20. Mr. Justice Powers, New South Wales Industrial Gazette, Vol. 10, No. 5
1915. p.920.
21. ibid. pp.922-924
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The severe economic position and unemplojmient and retrenchment in the
early years of the war gave workers little opportunity to improve their
conditions - legal restrictions prevented improvements through Wages Boards,
and a pool of unemployment meant any direct action would be unlikely to
succeed.

Not until the successful Coalminers' Strike in 1916 did the

position change, and by then unionists everywhere were ready to take
action to alleviate their frustrations.

Such was the position in 1917.

These generally poor conditions affected unionists as a whole but
on the eve of the strike, many unions had specific grievances of their
own, none more so than the various railway unions. On the 8th August,
Mr. Ainsworth, secretary of the Locomotive Engine Drivers, Firemen and
Cleaners' Association stated a number of grievances his Union had:
"Do you know - do the public know - that the eight-hour
principle as applied to us is a misnomer?... A man may
be called to sign on at 2 a.m. and when he arrives with
his food supply, he is told that he is not wanted, but
to come again at 4 a.m. ... For this time, he is not
paid. He was been walking and waiting all through the
night and then, when the official deigns to sign him on,
he is worked for anything up to twelve, and sometimes
thirteen, hours". 22
Ainsworth also mentioned other grievances, such as broken shifts, short
time, the difficulty of putting cases to the Appeals Board and the way the
Commissioners could dismiss employees without advancing reasons. These were
all major causes for dissatisfaction and the Card System was merely "a spark
23
that fell in a cauldron of seething discontent and industrial impatience."

22.

The Case of the Locomotive Engine Drivers, Firemen and Cleaners'
Association published with the concurrence of the Unions' Defence
Committee.

23.

ibid.

Daily Telegraph 9th August, 1917.
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Representatives of the Amalgamated Society of Engineers, as was
stated in the previous chapter, complained that slackness and waste in
the workshops, for which the workers were being held responsible, was
mainly the result of managerial incompetence, and lack of tools, equipment
24
and materials.

Mr. Claude Thompson, secretary of A.R.T.S.A. outlined

similar complaints, but added others:
"For upwards of thirty years
under an oppressive system,
and a miserable pittance of
of waiting they received an
satisfactory." 25

men have been groaning
unbearable conditions,
wages. After long years
award which was not

He claimed that the service was "seething with discontent" that was the
result of a "long policy of pinpricks and goadings on the part of the
Railway Commissioners".

He claimed too that the Card System only

sparked off trouble that had already been brewing.

Members of the New

South Wales Amalgamated Sheet Metal Worker Society complained that engineers
at the Randwxck workshops were doing their work, such as soldering.

27

This appears to be of little importance but, in fact, to the union members,
it was quite significant.
Although the Card System initially was confined to a relatively small
number of engineers working at Randwick, it was widely believed by the
workers in the Service, that the system would spread to other branches and
to other workshops.

Other unionists were ready to support the engineers

in their fight against the Card System but also wanted to air their own
grievances.

24.

This made the task difficult for the Defence Committee

Manifesto of Unions' Defence Committee, 11th August 1917. Quoted from
J.B. Holme, N.S.W. Strike Crisis 1917, Appendix 20, pp. 94a-95a.

25.

Statement authorised by the Unions' Defence Committee, S.M.H. 9th
August, 1917.

26.

ibid.
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because other issues clouded the central dispute over the Card System.
E.J. Kavanagh pointed out the problems:
"It was originally intended to confine the strike to
those directly affected by the Card System, but this
was impossible owing to the general dissatisfaction
which existed throughout the Railway Service, due to
the failure to remedy long-standing grievances and to
the limited scope of the Arbitration Act, which precluded the Court or Boards from dealing with matters
of vital importance to the employees." 28
After the strike broke out in the Railway workshops, it soon spread
to all industries, embracing unions that had no immediate connection at
all with the Card System.

Miners, builders, catering unions, wharf labourers

seamen, all came out in support of the railway men. Boote described this
in the Worker:
"One after another the unions rushed to the assistance
of their mates who were attacked. They needed no
prompting. They did not wait to be appealed to.
With a passion for class loyalty as grand as unparalleled,
they took the field and swept to battle."29
The degree of support amongst the "sympathy" strikers is significant.
Many unions involved had little or nothing to gain from striking; some
had a lot to lose.

For example, the coalminers had won a good award in

1916, with the provision that they would take no part in strikes for a
period of three years.

They had a good deal to lose. So did the wharf

labourers, who were working under a favourable Federal award.

That they

all felt the need to express their dissatisfaction in this way is a
reflection of the discontent that existed in the unions.
conspiracy that brought them out.

It was not

It was, as Boote described, "a spontan-

. „ 30
ecus manifestation of feelxng".

28.

Labour Council of New South Wales. Report, 1917, p.3.

29.

The Worker, 16th August, 1917.

30.

ibid.
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CHAPTER FOUR

The Extent of the Strike and Its Defeat
After the Engineers stopped work on the morning of 2nd August, there
was still time to negotiate a settlement, and avoid a general strike.
Since the Card System only affected a relatively small number of men, an
early settlement would have been desirable, and possibly easier to achieve.
Yet both sides made only tentative gestures, and already their intransigence was evident.

It was still possible at this time for a settlement

to be reached without either side losing face, and subsequent events showed
that tactical blunders by both sides contributed to the fateful strike.
Negotiations for a settlement did take place between the Government
and the Defence Committee for the Unions. The point on which the negotiations broke downwas the timing of an inquiry on the Card System.

The

government, with the concurrence of the Commissioners, made the following
offers to the unions:
1.

That if in three months it could, before a public inquiry,
be shown that the system was unjust, it would be revised.

2.

That every man should, each day if so desired, inspect and
initial his card relating to the previous day's work.

The latter proposal would theoretically allay any fears the workmen may
have had regarding abuses in implementing the Card System.

The men had

been concerned that the cards would be kept secret and they would not know
how accurate entries by the sub-foremen would be.

The first proposal

suggested that the Card System be given a trial, and if found to be
unsatisfactory, it would be replaced, but such was the lack of faith

1.

Government ultimatum, S.M.H. 7th August, 1917.
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amongst the men towards the Government and the Commissioners, that Mr.
Dengate had to point out that "it was no use giving this a trial for
some months or years and then find we cannot get rid of it".^

It is

significant that the Government's proposal offered only a revision of
the system if it was found unsatisfactory, and not a withdrawal, which
was what the men wanted.
E. J. Kavanagh made a set of counter-proposals to the Government.
These were that:
1.

The Railway Commissioners revert to the position as it
existed on the 1st June last

2.

The Government appoint a Royal Commission consisting of
representatives of the Railway Commissioner and the
Unions concerned
3

3.

Upon this being granted, the men will return to work.

These proposals could have been accepted.

The Government could still

have saved face, and would have appeared reasonable, with the best
interests of the men at heart.

Furthermore, it was likely that any inquiry

would have accepted the Card System in principle.

Thus, not only could

the Card System have been introduced but a strike could also have been
avoided.

Further proposals were submitted to the Government from a

deputation on the 8th August.

These were a little more specific and

suggested that;

2,

Dengate, Second Deputation to the Commissioners, Appendix J,
Curlewis Commission p.83.

3.

From a letter to E.J. Kavanagh to G. Fuller, 4th August, 1917 Quoted
from J.B. Holme, The N.S.W. Strike Crisis 1917, p. B8a.
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1.

The State Government request Mr. Justice Edmunds to act
as arbitrator and to inquire into the whole grievance

2.

In the meantime, the Card System was suspended

3.

On Mr. Justice Edmunds being appointed, all the employees
return to work, or alternatively,

4.

The inquiry be held while the men are out, the strike in
the meantime to be no further extended.

It would be wrong to assume that the Government had a responsibility to
accept the men*s demands as such. But to have taken a position that
ensured that a major and catastrophic strike would take place surely
showed a lack of responsibility.

This is particularly the case when it

is considered that the Nationalists had been elected on a platform
which stressed the importance of winning the war. This apparent contradiction prompted one Labor M.L.A. to ask
"... is it a fact that the Nationalist Party was elected,
or obtained the confidence of the people, on account of
its policy to assist in winning the war? If so, does he
(Fuller) not think that the methods now being adopted by
the Railway Commissioners, supported by the Cabinet, are
one means of arresting the enemy rather than of assisting
to win the war?"5
When the Engineers cameout on 2nd August, they were soon followed
by fuelmen at Eveleigh on the 3rd and the Locomotive Engine Drivers,
Firemen and Cleaners' Association and A.R.T.S.A. on the 5th August. These
unions joined in sympathy with the Engineers, but also to redress some of
their own grievances.

4.

In fact, the L.E.D.F.C.A. appointed a grievance

S.M.H. 9th August 1917. This deputation was headed by A.C. Willis,
of the A.C.S.E.F.

5.

Mr. Keegan N.S.W.P.P. (Second Series) Vol. LXVII pp. 441-442.
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committee to prepare a case that could be presented to the Commissioner
in the event of a settlement.

At any rate, by the end of the first week

of the strike, employees from most sections of the Railway and Tramway
Service were on strike.
position was evident.

Yet already, a basic weakness in the unions'

Not all employees in the service did stop work.

A sufficient number stayed at work, and with the assistance of staff
members, the Railway Commissioners were able to keep at least a skeleton
service operating.

This greatly weakened the position of the strikers.

Such was the discontent among the workers in New South Wales that
when the strike broke out in the railway workshops, the possibility of a
general strike soon loomed as a reality.

As previously stated, rank-and-file

willingness to down tools, while amenable to the concept of working class
solidarity, put the Defence Committee in a weak tactical position.

It could

not determine the extent of the strike, nor plan tactics as unions came
out and went back to work in piecemeal fashion.

The problems of the

Defence Committee were made difficult too by the nature of the union movement itself.

For example, within the railway service, "there was a wide

range of specialised and dependent skills, each represented by a separate
7
union".
That is, there existed a basic interdependence of work roles.
Different crafts were represented by different unions and indirectly, this
led to an interdependence within unionism too. Thus, if one union went
out on strike, workmen from another union would become idle. This principle
spread to unions outside the service.
Federation.

Such was the case with the Miners'

The miners were idle from the beginning of the strike. J.B.

Holme reported that:

6.

J.B. Holme, The N.S.W. Strike Crisis 1917, p. 10a

7.

Dan Coward "Crime and Punishment", Strikes ed. J. Iremonger, J. Merritt
G. Osborne p.64.
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"Coledale, Scarborough, Coalcliff and Scarborough
Junction collieries and the Metropolitan Mine at
Helensburgh were all idle on the 6th August as a
result of their dependence upon the railways for
rolling stock and transit." 8
Other mines, with their own rolling stock and transit facilities
remained at work.

Mines in the northern district also were idle, because

of the failure of the train services. With the shortage of materials,
works in Lithgow closed down and more men were made idle.

The strike spread

almost involuntarily beyond the Railway Service.
The strike became official in the Southern mining district when the
Defence Committee declared all coal being used by the Railway Commissioners
9
as "black".
At Bulli, the men refused to work because an employee had
travelled by train after the railway strike had been declared,
anathema to the principles of unionism.

which was

Mines in the northern district

too were idle at this time and the miners formally joined the strike through
solidarity with other unions. All coal mines in New South Wales were
idle by the 8th of August.
From this point on, the strike became complex as it spread quickly,
and the rapidity of the events occtirring caused much confusion.

But it

was the strength of the "sympathy" principle that enabled the strike to
gather momentum.
On the 9th August, wharf labourers in Sydney held a stop-work meeting
and resolved that they would not resume work unless the Government
immediately withdrew the cards objected to by the railway employees.

8.

J.B. Holme op. cit. p.11a

9.

This was on the 6th August.

10. J.B. Holme op. cit. p. 11a
11. S.M.H.

10th August 1917

J.B. Holme op. cit. p. 10a.
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Trolley dragmen and carters, in the meantime, refused to handle goods
because it was the duty of wharf labourers. On the 11th, the Defence
Committee declared all wheat and floixr arriving by train to be "black".
Because of the wharf labourers' strike, the seamen joined on the 12th
August and ship painters the next day. By the 15th most employees of the
fuel, food and transport industries were on strike, severely paralyzing
much of the State's industry.

At the peak, some 68,000 men were on strike.

13

The Defence Committee made some bad blunders early in the strike.
Its aim had been to limit the dispute to those unions affected by the card
issue directly.

However, in its effort to paralyze rail transport, it chose

to declare coal "black" first, and then later to declare wheat and flour
"black".

Unfortunately this move did not have the desired effect.

Instead

of crippling train services, it brought a number of unions into the dispute
which in reality had no part in it.

It simply served to cloud the issue,

and made the Committee's task of co-ordinating strike activities more
difficult.

Kavanagh realised the weakness of the position of the strikers,

but with the Defence Committee swelling each day with representatives of
striking workers, there was little he could do but continue to give tacit
support to the strike.

A.C. Willis, the secretary of the Australasian

Coal and Shale Employees' Federation, and the Central Council of the
Federation were particularly conscious of the weak position of the miners.
At the time of the strike, there were large stockpiles of coal at grass,
and if the Government could keep even minimal transport services operating.

12.

J.B. Holme op. cit. p.14a

13.

Estimates of this figure varied depending on whether official
or union sources were used.

This figure is about an average.
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the position of the Miners Federation would be weak."""^ In addition, the
miners had received a very good award in 1916, and involvement in the strike
would give the impression of contrariness more so since the Card System
did not concern the miners. Willis stated that the miners
"... had absolutely no quarrel with the Government or
with the colliery proprietors at present. They had a
three year agreement, and as far as possible the men
would abide by it. The position of the coalminers in
relation to the present trouble was almost entirely
due to circumstances over which they had no control.
Work would resume immediately the railway trouble was
settled."15
Willis was responsible for some negotiating with the Government about terras
15

for a resumption of work, but his offer was refused.

Mr. Morris, secretary

of the Waterside Workers' Federation, faced similar problems when the strike
extended to a number of major ports throughout Australia.

The Committee

of Management, the central authority of the W.W.F. which was based in
Melbourne, had little control over the actions of the various branches.
When firstly the Commonwealth Steamship Owners' Association applied to
have Preference clauses struck from the award, and then the Federal Government applied for de-registration of the union, the Committee of Management
was forced to amend the rules of the W.W.F. empowering them to fine or
expel any members failing to obey the instructions of the Committee of
Management.17 This was done in accordance with directives from Mr. Justice
Higgins, who was concerned that the Committee could not induce the men to
return to work.

14.

R. Gollan

The Coalminers of New South Wales (Melbourne 1953) p.153.

15.

South Coast Times 10th August, 1917.

16.

S.M.H. 9th August, 1917

17.

Minutes, Committee of Management, 31st August, 24th September, 1917.

18.

Minutes, Special meeting of Committee of Management, 11th October, 1917.
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It is vital to note here, that while shipping was tied up in a number
of ports for certain period during the strike, there were still attempts
being made by the W.W.F, and other unions to assist the war effort. One
such port was Port Pirie which was an important one since a bulk of the
munitions needed for the war were shipped from there. The Committee of
Management insisted thafthe members of the Port Pirie branch handle all
cargoes necessary for the production of munitions to carry on the war
against the enemies of England".-"-^ Again, on the 17th September, a
meeting of representative from a number of unions moved the following
resolution:
"Recognising that the continuous production of lead at the
Port Pirie Lead and Zinc Smeltery is vital to the Cause of
Great Britain and the Allies in the War, it is recommended that:
1. These works be declared immune from participation
in any labour trouble or sympathy strike during
the period of the war ...
2. In order to ensure continuous operations at the
smelters, arrangements be made for producing all
coke and coal required, transporting it to Port
Pirie and unloading it there by union labour, and
the unions concerned agree to find the labour
required for this purpose..." 20
Evidently, there were unionists who were concerned that the war effort
should not be hindered by disputes in these important areas.
Nevertheless, the Nationalist Government showed from the outset that
it was prepared to take a hard line with the strikers.

Having failed to

induce the men to go back to work with his offer of an inquiry after three
months, Fuller issued the following statement:

19.

Minutes, ibid 8th September, 1917.

20.

Minutes, ibid 17th September, 1917. The agreement was signed by
the following union representatives; Grayndler, A.W.U.: Thornton.
A.S.E.:

Cremer, W.W.F.:

Johnson, F.B.F.:

Pearce, F.E.D.F.E.:

Wilson, F.I.A.

Smith, A.B.L.F.:
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"After Friday next, no workman will go back on his old
status. The men who stand by the Government in this
crisis will be amply protected, and will receive and
maintain seniority in the future. The men who refuse
to return will lose the special rights and privileges
which they now enjoy as employees of the State. If
the strike does not terminate before ordinary working
time on Friday next, the Government will utilise the
offers of services already made and will call for
volunteers to assist in running the services of this
State." 21
Mr. Fuller next indicated that unions, as they existed, were not appropriate,
and more loyal unions would be created:
"All Unionists who volunteer for work will be accepted
as Unionists, and will be enrolled as members of the
new unions registered under the Trades Unions' Acts."22
This, he claimed, showed that the "Government is not against the Unions".
The crucial period of the strike was in the first few days.

23

It was

evident almost from the start that the strike would not have the full
support of all the workmen in the Service.
every day.

Some trains and trams ran

This, together with the number of volunteers applying for work

every day, must have heartened the Government.
was most successful.

The call for volunteers

The Government had advertised for experienced people

to operate the services:
"Engine drivers, Engineers, Firemen, Mechanics and others
necessary for maintaining railway and other traffic,
and the distribution of food supplies are invited to
offer their services. If they desire to stay in the
Government service, they will be left in that service.
All men capable of assisting are invited to communicate
with the Government." 24

21.

S.M.H. 8th August, 1917

22.

From the Sunday Times, 12th August, 1917. Quoted from J.B. Holme,
op. cit. p.82a

23.

ibid.

24.

S.M.H.

8th August, 1917.
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Many people did volunteer but the quality of some of these was sometimes questionable, since many were unable to pass the basic physical
fitness tests required by the Department.

Jack Lang, M.L.A., observed:

"The Railway Commissioner, with the support of the National
Government, has gone right back upon his departmental
policy, and today men who were removed because of their
failure to pass the eyesight test are finding employment in
positions which involve the lives of thousands of travellers".
To these volunteers were added inexperienced schoolboys and students from
Sydney University.

It was a calculated gamble to employ such recruits,

but it paid off for the Government as train services improved slightly
each day.

That the Government was able to draw so many volunteers was

significant for two reasons.

Firstly, it was a reflection of the high

unemployment at the time, and men were willing to work under almost any
circumstances.

Secondly, the strike showed that support for the war was

still evident amongst the younger people of the community.
On Monday the 13th August, all strikers who did not return to work
were formally dismissed from the Service.

This, Fuller explained,

involved "the forfeiture of all their rights under the Superannuation
26
Act".

At this time, the Government made applications to the Industrial

Court "to cancel the registration of all unions on strike, as well as
their awards".

27

To ensure that the Government could keep central control of State
services, various proclamations were issued.

One gave the Government

the power to assume control over all kind of motor vehicles, another gave
25.

N.S.W.P.D. (Second Series) Vol. LXVII, p.451

26.

S.M.H. 10th August, 1917.

27.

ibid.

According to the Striker, when unions were de-registered

they came "within the purview of the Unlawful Associations Act".
(13th August, 1917).

Unionists insisted that this situation had

been deliberately created by the Nationalists.
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the Government the power to take all coal in trucks and at grass.
Next, the Government assumed control of all the mines. Acts of Parliament
enabled the Government to supply inexperienced labour in the coal mines,
29
and also to control gas cons\imption.

In mid-August, the Federal

Government intervened on behalf of the Government of New South Wales.
New regulations were added to the War Precautions Act and made interference
30
with shipping or shearing procedures illegal.

The latter was particularly

effective because it made certain that the powerful A.W.U. would not join
the strike.

In addition to the regulations, the Prime Minister, Mr. Hughes,

established a National Service Bureau which recruited more volunteer labour
to load ships and to work the mines.
With plenty of volunteers and most services operating, the railway
strike was virtually over by the end of August.

To hasten the end, the

government had the most prominent leaders of the unions arrested and charged
with conspiracy.

First, William Daly of the Seamen's Union was arrested.

A few days later, Kavanagh, Thompson and Willis were arrested and later,
Buckley, too, was charged.

31

This virtually deprived the strike of any

28.

See Appendices nos. 26 and 27 in J.B. Holme, op. cit., p.103a.

29.

J.B. Holme, op.cit. Appendix 33, the Coalmines Proclamation Act, 1917;
and Appendix 34, the Electrical Lighting and Gas Emergency Act, 1917,
p. 106a.

30.

Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics. Labour and Industrial
Branch Report No. 8 (July, 1918) p.125)
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The charge of "conspiracy" is interesting.

The original charge of the

I.W.W. Twelve - treason - had been changed to conspiracy because it was
easier to prove. All that has to be established is an agreement between

the two parties to the conspiracy to do something unlawful. (See I. Turner,
Sydney's Burning, p.49).

The charges against the strike leaders were

not heard until after the strike was defeated and all were acquitted.
The men were probably arrested on these charges for political gain,
to give credence to the Government's allegation of conspiracy, and
also to deprive the strike of its leaders.
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leadership and the men had little option but to negotiate a settlement.
This was achieved on the 8th September
for re-employment.

and by the 10th men were applying

So ended the railway section of the strike.

The Government's uncompromising stance during the strike showed an
inclination to fight the unions to the finish and force them into a
unconditional surrender, but it seems a strange course of action for a
Government committed to winning the war, to expend so much time and money
hindering the war effort.

At no time did the Government enter into any

serious n^otktions with the intention of reaching a quick and equitable
settlement. Even when the Lord Mayor of Sydney and some notable church
leaders offered to act as mediators, they were brushed aside with curt
refusals.

The Government even refused to have further dealings with the

Defence Committee.

Final negotiations were left to J.B. Holme, the

Industrial Commissioner for the State, but even then final endorsement
was left to the Government.

Naturally, the Government's actions were

wholly approved of by the various employer organisations.

After the

collapse of the railway strike, workers in other industries were left to
negotiate their own terms of settlement with respective employers, but
once again Governmental involvement was evident.

33

Perhaps Kavanagh best

summed up the debacle for the unions, when in his report he concluded that:
"Prior to the strike. Trades Unionism had reached the
highest pinnacle it had ever reached in this country.
It took just twenty-seven years of hard work to bring
it to that state of perfection. It was built up by
arbitration and knocked down in twenty-seven days by
direct action." 34

32.

See Appendix I for the terms of settlement.

33.

The Government largely determined the conditions for the re-employment
of the coalminers and the settlement of that dispute, and also accepted
the development of bureaux on the wharves.

This will be discussed

in Chapter 5.
on

Labour Council of New South Wales, Report, p.18
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As the role of the I.W.W. in the strike, and allegation of a conspiracy to threaten the Nationalist Government, little can be added. By
August, the I.W.W. as an organisation was almost defunct. When the strike
broke out, the remainder of tlie leaders were arrested.

As Tom Barker tells,

"soon the Government was picking us up and putting us behind bars" because
"Hughes was going to have another crack at Conscription later in the year
35
and he wanted us out of the way for that".

The last issue of Direct

Action even carried a criticism of the strike and its leaders:
"We must have scientific organisation which means all
workers in the one industry in the one union, and all
industries linked up into one concrete body of the
working class with a general Executive Committee
controlling the whole dispute ...
Almost a score of different unions are on strike, and
each union seems to be trying to settle the troiibe
in its own little way ... This very lax and inefficient
system only spreads discontent among the men, and they
at last become tired of hanging around doing nothing, and
getting dissatisfied, defeat will follow." 36.
It was,in fact, more than a mere criticism.
core of I.W.W. ideology.

35.

E.C. Fry, op. cit. p.31

36.

Direct Action, 18th August, 1917,

It was related to the very

42.
CHAPTER FIVE

The Aftermath of the Strike
The aftermath of the strike revealed the full intent of the Nationalists and the employers to punish the unionists for their part in the strike,
E.J. Kavanagh commented in apparent bitterness that
the employers, backed up by the Government, are
taking full advantage of the surplus labour, and
hungry unemployed, and are 'putting the boots in'
with a vengeance, regardless of the misery and
suffering of the innocent women and children.
Never in the history of Australia has there been
such callous vindictiveness shown towards the
workers excepting perhaps in the convict days."
The punishments meted out to the unionists were severe, and left a residue
of bitterness that survived for many years.

The way in which the Government

of New South Wales handled the strike and the events immediately after,
came under the scrutiny of a Royal Commission in 1922, and it was then
that many irregularities and illegalities surfaced.
The methods adopted by the Government of New South Wales during the
strike raised a number of matters which showed that these actions were
legally questionable, but were decisive in the outcome of the strike.
Under the existing Railway Act, ministers of the Government had no legal
powers to involve themselves in any relationships between the Railway
Commissioners and their employees unless they passed a validating Act
of Parliament.

Since no such Act was ever passed, "there was no legal

foundation for any of the promises made by Ministers in their capacity as
Ministers, as distinguished from persons acting on behalf of the

1.

Labour Council of New South Wales, Report, p. 18
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2
Commissioners".

Furthermore, the power to make proclamations under the

"extraordinary powers" should have been exercised by Executive Government,
not by Cabinet alone, and public records should have been kept in appropriate Departments of any acts of intervention of the Executive Government.
Mr. Justice Edmunds, presiding over the Royal Commission in 1922, was
"unable to find any records except so-called Proclamations and documents
3
in Holmes' report".

Thus he concluded that the powers assumed by the

Government of New South Wales were invalid.
This was significant because it meant that promises made by Acting
Premier Fuller, such as the promise made on the 12th August, that
volunteers would be enrolled as members of new unions registered under the
Trades Union Act, enabled him to use volunteers to break the strike, but
it was one which, in Mr. Justice Edmunds' words, "he had no legal authority
to make".

In other words, he took decisive actions which helped to

defeat the strike, but which were illegal. The Government, too, took over
negotiations with the Defence Committee for a return to work.

So the

Commissioners were committed to taking actions during the strike, and
enacting the settlement proposals when they were barely consulted in the
5
matter.
Thus, when the unions accepted the proposals presented by Mr. Holme,
2.

Report cf the Royal Commission of Inquiry into the Administration,
Control, and Economy of the Railway and Tramway Services of New South
Wales, N.S.W.P.P. (Second Session), 1922, Vol. 3, p.xxxix

3.

ibid. p. xxxvi

4.

ibid. p. xxxix

5.

ibid. p. XXV.

Mr. Fraser claimed that the Government had not consulted

with him at all, but was found to be lying when Commissioner Fox's
diary showed that they had met with Government Ministers on the night
the settlement proposals were drawn up on the 8th September.
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the Commissioners felt bound to carry out the proposals "according to the
interpretation which the Government put on it".^

It was concluded by

H.V. Evatt, acting on behalf of the men at the Edmunds' Commission, the
"political pressure was exercised on the Railway Commissioners by the
Nationalist Government and the Nationalist Party"."^
There is evidence whick. shows that the Government had intentions
early in the strike of destroying existing unions and creating new unions.
This at least was the case with unions whose members were employed by the
government.

On the 10th of August, at a meeting with the Heads of

Branches, Mr. Fraser suggested that, while all men should belong to a
union "no man employed by the Piiblic Service of the State shall be a member
of any union affiliated with unions outside of the Government Service".

8

At a later meeting, Fraser told the Heads that "the Government had no
intention at all of having one big Public Service Union, but they do desire
that the railway and tramway men should belong to various Public Service
Unions - Craft Unions and that sort of thing".

To achieve this, Fraser

went on, "the Government seems to think it might be of some advantage if
we allocated certain individuals to work amongst the men to see if any
g
such unions could be formed or some existing unions wiped in their membership".

5.

ibid. p.XXV

7.

H.V. Evatt, The 1917 Strike and the Aftermath (Sydney, 1924) p.8.

8. Edmunds' Commission p.xxiv. Mr. Fraser was evidently aware of Government
policy regarding the strike, and possibly sympathetic with the Nationalists' policies generally.

One Labor M.L.A., Mr. McGirr, had accused

Mr. Fraser of partisanship during the strike. He further alleged that
during the Conscription Referendum, Mr. Fraser had sent "Yes" pamphlets
throughout the State. N.S.W.P.D.(Second Series) Vol. LXVII, p.521
9.

Evatt,op. cit. p.9
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This was consistent with statements that Fuller had made himself that "all
unionists who volunteer will be enrolled as members of new unions, registered
under the Trade Union Act". ° And so, the Government of New South Wales
set out to create new Government-sponsored trade unions.
The first stage was the de-registration of the existing unions. All
the unions with members working for the Railways and Tramways Department
had their registrations cancelled on the 23rd August.

Others were de-

registered progressively throughout the rest of the year."^""" The applications
were made mainly in the names of the Ministry for Labour and Industry,
12

and the Railway Commissioners for New South Wales.

At a subsequent

meeting of the Railway Commissioners, a number of men considered to be suitable were selected from amongst the employees to carry on a campaign in the
Railway Service for the formation of new unions and the extinction of old
13
ones.

For this, they were paid handsome wages and given free passes.

However, on their time sheets, these men were shown as having been performing
their ordinary duties, or being engaged in special duties.

There was nothing

to indicate that these men were involved in organising new unions. When
questioned. Fuller denied any knowledge of the activities of men with
special passes organising new unions and to this, Mr. Justice Edmunds replied
14
that Fuller's answer was a "deliberate attempt to suppress the truth".
Evatt, in commenting on the formation of the bogus unions, concluded that

10.

The Striker (issued by the authority of the Unions' Defence Committee)
Sydney, 13th August, 1917.

11.

From the "Review of Industrial Dislocations", N.S.W. Industrial Gazette
Vol. XIII, No. 2, February 1918, pp. 143-145. See Appendix H for details.

12.

A number of unions whose members were employed in private industry were
de-registered as well, upon application from thei respective employers.
These cases will be dealt with later in the chapter.

13.

Edmunds' Commission, p.lxviii

14.

ibid. p. Ixviii
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"all the elements of conspiracy were present. There was
agreement between the Government and the Commissioners.
There was secrecy. Deception was practised in Parliament.
The genuine unions were prevented from ascertaining the
truth."15.
Mr, Justice Edmunds did not necessarily agree that a conspiracy did exist,
but he did condemn the actions of the Government and the Commissioners
as a matter of policy:
"... any action of the kind taken is sure to be regarded
as a covert attempt to ensnare the employees into a
union that will be more solicitous for the interests of
the employers than for those of the workmen." 16
At least three new unions were formed in the Railway Service. These were
the Australian Railways Union (which still survives today); the United Crown
and Railway Services Association; and the Association of Employees (Mechanical Branch) of the New South Wales Government Railways."'"'^
The railway section was settled when the Defence Committee agreed to
18
proposals put by J.B. Holme.

The settlement was actually in two parts -

a written agreement of seven clauses, but also a nimiber of verbal undertakings
on the part of the Government. Two clauses of the written agreement dealt
specifically with allowing unions to take their grievances to the Court of
Industrial Arbitration, if in the jurisdiction of the Court.

The Government

agreed to amend an Act to give the Court the necessary jurisdiction to
deal with grievances.

This was a necessary concession.

Since the Card

System was not a matter of wages or conditions, the Court was not able to
arbitrate during the strike. The Government, intent on forcing a total

15.

Evatt, op.cit. p.10

16.

Edmunds' Commission, p.lxix

17.

Both A.R.T.S.A. (Minutes, 24th September, 1917) and the New South Wales
Amalgamated Sheet Metal Workers' Society (Minutes, 27th September, 1917
and 11th October, 1917)

stressed their opposition to the registration

of these unions but were unsuccessful.
18.

For the terms of the settlement, see Appendix I.
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surrender by the unions, did not want the unions to arbitrate, so took no
steps to amend the existing legislation.

Clauses 4 and 5 theoretically

then gave the unions a chance to air their grievances at the Court of
Industrial Arbitration, so could possible prevent similar strikes occurring
in the future. Yet, in one case, that of the Locomotive Engine Drivers,
Firemen and Cleaners' Association, when the union brought its grievances
to the Court, counsel for the Railway Commissioners objected to the union
appearing because it was de-registered.

This was after the union had been

given a written undertaking that it could appear before the Court.
It was Clause 7 that was most flagrantly abused by the Government.
That clause stated that "it is mutually understood that work shall be
resumed without resentment, and employment offered without vindictiveness".
In fact, wholesale victimisation did take place. "Black lists" were drawn
up, by men who were in no position to make judgements.

It was "an open

season for vindictive informers."^ One list of undesirables was drawn up
by Mr. Weaver, M.L.A., Minister of Railways and long-time critic of the
I.W.W. Another was compiled by Driver Piper, a loyalist who had opposed
were
the strike. These lists/presented to the Heads of Branches, who refused
re-employment to men whose names appeared on the lists. Mr, Justice
Edmunds concluded that those men whose names appeared on these lists were
"... men who had given unsatisfactory work in the past, had
taken a prominent part in carrying on the strike, men who
were suspected of sympathising with the I.W.W., men who
had been guilty of intimidation of loyalists or other covert
acts during the course of the strike, and slow and indifferent workers". 21
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Evatt, op.cit. p.15

20.

Gollan, op.cit. p.154

21.

Edmunds' Commission, p.xxviii
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On this basis, thousands of men were refused re-employment.

Those who

were re-employed were obliged to sign forms titled "Form of application
for re-employment of men who left duty on strike".

Those men, although

employed, forfeited all their seniority and superannuation rights. Ben
Chifley was one of these men. Before the strike, he had been employed as
a driver in the railway service. After the strike, he was not re-employed.
He appealed and was finally re-appointed as a fireman. He shared the
bitterness of his fellow workers, but it also changed the course of his
life:
"I should not be a member of this Parliament today
if some tolerance had been extended to the men who
took part in the strike of 1917. All that harsh and
oppressive treatment did as far as I was concerned
was to transform me, with the assistance of my colleagues, from
an ordinary engine driver into the Prime Minister of this
country". 23.
It was, in all, a humiliating the bitter experience for all those men who
had gone on strike.

To ensure that volunteers and loyalists would get

preference in employment and promotion, the Railway Commissioners modified
the basic eyesight and hearing standards for volunteers.

Even then, when

a number of volunteers were dismissed for failing to achieve even the
minimum standards, Mr. Holman exerted pressure on the Commissioners to
keep the volunteers employed because, he claimed "any dismissal of a
siibstantial number of loyalists at the present time will have a very serious
effect on certain delicate matters of public policy that are new being
24
determined". Thus, volunteers who were found to be medically unfit were
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24.
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retained in the Service, while some former employees remained out of
work for years later.

The Government of New South Wales was responsible

for gross violations of the agreements, which confirmed their intentions
of crushing organised unionism connected with the Public Service.
The victimisation was not confined to the railway workers. Similar
actions were taken by the Government on the coalfields.

The Government

of New South Wales took over control of the collieries on the 23rd August.
Asked if the proclamation to seize the coalmines was valid, Mr. Justice
Higgins replied that it was "wholly invalid, not worth the paper it was
written on, and it was not supported by the prerogative of the Crown, or
by the Crown's right of eminent domain on which the proclamation expressly
25
purported to be based".
Nevertheless, with the assistance of the Federal
Government, which established the National Service Bureaux, the New South
Wales Government was able to keep the mines working with volunteer labour.
It was necessary to amend the Coal Mines Regulation Act to enable non27
With the help of volunteer
skxlled labour to be used in the mines.
labour, the Government was able to produce sufficient coal, and this put
the Miners' Federation in a weak bargaining position. The Government's
terms of settlement were harsh - no mines were to be treated as "black",
loyalists and volunteers would be retained ahead of strikers in employment
and no guarantees of re-employment would be offered to the striking miners.
This prompted the Federation to state
"We are fully convinced, from the Government's latest
proposals, that the Government has no desire to effect
a settlement except on conditions which we consider
humiliating the degrading". 28
25.

S.M.H. 24th August, 1917.
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The High Court has been asked if the

proclamation taking over control of the coal mines within the State
during the strike was valid.
27.
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The Government pressed further and made the terms more severe so that
"members of the Coal Miners' Federation(would) agree to work with local
workers, and to admit them to membership of the Federation if they so
desired".

29

Eventually, the miners were forced to accept the Governments

terms and return to work.

Lists of undesirables were again drawn up,

30
and these men victimised as the railway men had been before, so that
loyalists and volunteers could be kept in their employment.
Private industry was equally harsh in its dealings with the strikers.
Companies like B.H.P., C.S.R., Schweppes and others sought and gained
31
de-registration of unions to which their workers belonged,
and imposed
harsh terms on them.

These included extracting promises of supporting

employer-sponsored unions^

For example, during an inquiry into a number

of grievances of fell mongers and wool sorters, and wool and basil workers
before Mr. Justice Heydon, it was revealed that the employers required the
workers to sign application forms setting out certain conditions which they
were to observe:
"3. The employee shall not oppose any application for
de-registration of the Wool and Basil Workers'
Association of New South Wales, and shall resign
his membership thereof, or of any other industrial
union. State or Federal, if when called upon by
the employer to do so.
4. The employee shall, when called upon, join and
support such new unions as the employers shall
approve". 32
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One of these victimised miners was interviewed by the author. He
was refused re-employment at the Bulli mine, and was out of work
for 18 months until re-employed at Richmond Main.

Taped interview
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Employers probably felt that they had the support of the Government and
the Courts in this actions.
The case of the Waterside Workers' Federation was a little different
from that of most other unions.

In the first place, the watersiders

were working under a Federal award, and so came under the jurisdiction of
the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration.

Secondly, the

W.W.F. was attacked from two sides. The Commonwealth Steamship Owners'
Association sought to have preference clauses withdrawn from the award,
and Hughes sought to have the union de-registered.. Both cases were heard
by Mr. Justice Higgins. The Steamship Owners' Association applied to
have the "preference" clauses struck from the award because it "embarrassed
33
them ito making use of outside labovir".
companies to use non-union labour.

This would enable the shipping

Mr. Justice Higgins did strike out

the preference clause, but suggested that the union should alter its rules
to give greater power to the Committee of Management, and ordered the
Federation to pay a bond as a guarantee of no stoppages.

34

With the loss

of the preference clause, the Federation came under fire. Bureaux were
established by the shipowners to replace the old mustering places. At the
bureau, a worker, if approved of by the employer, was given a disc which
enabled him to work. Naturally, preference was given to volunteer or
non-union labour, because "it was considered desirable that the members
of the wharf labourers' unions should not be allowed to swamp the wharves".

33.
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Workers joining new employer-sponsored unions would naturally get discs
ahead of Federation members.

Mr. Justice Higgins noted that "even

certain soldiers, competent waterside workers, members of the Federation,
were all refused employment through one of the Sydney bureaux, unless
they joined a new union formed under the influence of the employers".'^'^'
Federation members were only to be employed if there was a shortage of
labour on the wharves.

Employers, in some cases, also felt confident in

attacking existing working conditions.

The Hobart branch of the W.W.F.

for example wrote to the General Secretary, Mr. Morris, complaining that
"Huddart Parker Ltd. (had) taken away ... all the domestic
rules granted ... by the Conciliation Board .,, and Calso)
all local conditions not mentioned in the award or order".38
The branch requested that the case be put to Mr. Justice Higgins. Victimisation on the wharves continued up until 1925 when the bureaux were
finally abandoned.
It was Hughes, however, a former president of the W.W.F. that threatened to do the most harm to the Federation.

Under the provisions of the

War Precautions Act, Hughes persuaded the Governor - General to sign a
regulation which would enable him to cancel the registration of any union
39
on strike.

Mr. Justice Higgins did not appreciate Hughes' actions,

stating that it seemed to say "You must cancel; for if you do not cancel,
I shall myself cancel".4o

36.

Mr. Justice Higgins dismissed the case arguing

One of these new unions was sponsored by tie New South Wales Steam Ship
Owners' Association, and was called the permanent and Casual Waterside
Labourers' and Stevedores' Union.

See Minutes, New South Wales

Steamship Owners' Association, 31st October, 1917.
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that "de-registration would not free the employers of obligations as to
wages and conditions imposed by the award", but it would free the Federation
and its properties from liability for penalties for strikes.^^

As an

aside, Mr. Justice Higgins, in what was probably a dig at Hughes, added
that "the powers to cancel were not to be used as an instrument of pointless
vengeance".42
This is an interesting point, in that it suggests a certain degree
of vindictiveness in Hughes' character. Hughes had been in conflict with
Mr. Justice Higgins since the.1916 Coal Strike when the latter refused to
be bullied into a decision of which he did not approve. When Mr, Justice
Higgins refused to de-register the W.W.F., Hughes was so incensed that he
contemplated having him replaced.

43

This continued in 1917 with the

Queensland Railway Strike (not connected with the New South Wales rail
strike).

Ryan, the Queensland Premier, asked Mr. Justice Higgins to act

as an independent arbitrator to settle the dispute. He agreed, but thought
that Hughes should be consulted as a matter of courtesy.

Hughes did not

give his sanction, claiming that the men had brought "into contempt the
State Court and Government authority, dislocating industry and having no
regard for the present life and death struggle in which Australia is involved."44
This made matters difficult for Ryan for no other reason than "the capacity
45
of Hughes for bastardry".
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"The attitude of the Prime Minister (in refusing to
permit Judge Higgins to arbitrate) shows that he is
determined to do all he can to prevent this Government
from bringing about industrial peace in this State.
The^workers of Queensland should wake up the situation
their political opponents are endeavouring to bring about".
The result was that Ryan and Hughes began to feud over the New South Wales
strike.

Ryan was urging Fuller to negotiate a settlement quickly, because

it seemed that the strike would spread to Queensland, since men were
refusing to handle goods consigned to Queensland at the border. Hughes
threatened to use provisions under the War Precautions Act to force
Queensland workers to carry all goods. There is an interesting contrast
here between Ryan, Hughes and Fuller.

Ryan constantly negotiated his

settlements, while Hughes and Fuller were intent on using coercion.
Hughes, in June 1917 made a proposal to A.S.E. which would promote
ship-building as part of the war effort. Hughes asked the A.S.E. for its
co-operation on a number of matters - the prevention of stoppages due to
trade disputes, the use of piecework systems, which Hughes believed would
help to increase production, and the dilution of labour if necessary.
Hughes made it clear that all proposals would have to be accepted.

47

In

July, the A.S.E. held ballots to decide, and various branches decided that
48
they would accept "continuity", but not "piecework" and "dilution".
So the shipbuilding program did not eventuate. Hughes had an obsession to
win the war, and did not look kindly upon people who interfered with the
war effort.

His extremely partisan and decisive actions in the 1917 strike,

could possibly be partly attributed to his anger at the A.S.E. decision.
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Certainly, the Watersiders' strike did infuriate him since it tied up
the ports and prevented essential shipping services from continuing. Hughes
confirmed his desire to maintain the war effort and, if necessary, to
punish unions who did not contribute when he stated that "Strikes in
time of war are a crime against society".
What is apparent from the evidence quoted in this chapter is that the
Nationalist Government of New South Wales violated agreements to achieve
their goals of destroying unionism.

The win-the-war Party wanted to

create an industrial situation where unions were subservient to the whims
of the Goverim:ient, and the country as a whole could concentrate on winning
the war.

They used the most coercive methods to crush and humiliate

the unions, and some of their activities were later judged as illegal. With
the help of Hughes, whose involvement was decisive the Nationalists achieved
a success that was almost complete.

49.

S.M.H.

11th August, 1917.
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CHAPTER SIX

A Government Conspiracy?
It has already been demonstrated that the Nationalists of New South
Wales, together with the Prime Minister, Mr. Hughes, and various employer
groups made an extensive and auccessful attack on trade unionism in 1917.
All agreed too that the strikers needed to be punished.

In 1918 the Railway

Commissioners informed the Minister for Public Works in a letter that
"It was recognised by the.Government and the Commissioners
that some punishment should be meted out to those men who
defied them and went out on strike."1
Hughes stated that "strikes in the time of war are a crime against society",
2
and strikers had to be punished for their crime.
The difficulty is in
Government
establishing whether or,not the Nationalist/of New South Wales, the Federal
Nationalist Government and various employers engaged in a "conspiracy" to
deliver this punishment, and for the piirpose of destroying unionism or at
least in some way changing or influencing its course.

To do so, it would

be necessary to show that there was a pre-arranged scheme developed by these
groups for that purpose.

It is unlikely that such a scheme was ever

developed, or even that it could be, for it is difficult to imagine, as
Childe points out, how the Government or the Employers' Federation could
3
"foresee the remifications which the strike could assume" . Marxist
interpretations do perhaps provide a scope for conspiracies of this natixre.
One such interprepatation is that capitalist power actually exists in
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state apparatuses, "determined by the social relations of production"
and "conspiracies occur when ruling in the old way becomes difficult".^
In other words, according to McQueen, conspiracies "attempt that the normal
functioning of state apparatuses cannot achieve, either at all, or as
effectively, or as speedily".^

In the case of New South Wales in 1917,

an unprovoked attack on the trade union movement could lead to a massive
destruction of unionism and the wholesale victimisation of its members.
The weakness of

this argument is firstly, that it cannot be shown that

there was premeditation for such a course; secondly, if the workers had
accepted the Card System,it is possible that the strike would not have
occurred.
Yet there were those in the labour movement who insisted that there
had indeed been prior agreements reached to destroy trade unionism.
Senator Gardiner alleged that the strike "was a pre-arranged attack on
unionism" and argued that
"whether it was pre-arranged or not - although I believe
it was - it is a fact that the Win-the-War Government
of New South Wales and the Federal Win-the-War Government
have made a successful attack upon our unions". 6
T. J. Ryan, the Premier of Queensland, on the same occasion claimed
that "... the members of the de-registered unions ... believe that the
Commonwealth Government was behind the employers in the recent great indust7
rial strike..." ' The Unions' Defence Committee alleged that "the
introduction of time cards was pruposely engineered to create an upheaval
4.
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in which unions and working standards could be attacked"^.

J. Lang,

M.L.A., supported this view:
"The Card System was not essential to the war effort.
It was just an excuse. Holman knew that an attempt
to force the issue would result in an upheaval. Yet
he permitted Fuller to take over and conduct the
campaign to break the strike as if he was engaged in
a war against a foreign enemy".9
Mr. Mutch, M.L.A., was also convinced that the Government and the
Employers' Federation were determined to break uniorism. He asked
"Why did the Chamber of Manufacturers, on the 7th of this
month (August) hold a meeting and decide that they
were prepared to close down the whole of the factories
of the State and starve the people".10
if there is no such plot.

Mutch pointed out that he had obtained this

information from the Melbourne Age, because, he claimed, newspapers in
New South Wales had been notified not to publish damaging information.
He concluded by accusing the Nationalists of using the political machine
of their party to organise volunteers and "scabs" throughout the country.
Yet another Labor M.L.A., Mr. Stuart-Robertson, also alleged a conspiracy:
"My own conclusion is that the Chief Commissioner is
merely the puppet of the Employers' Federation. He
is bringing this thing to a head in the interests of
the Employers' Federation generally for the pixrpose
of breaking down the arbitration award where the
award is little above the living wage".12
Much of this is merely allegation but is must have been obvious to the
Railway Commissioners and the Government that the introduction of time
cards would lead to trouble, so their insistence on the implementation
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of the system could be considered provocative.
Suspicions of some impending conflict between Government and labour
existed even before the Card System was re-introduced in July 1917.
H.E. Boote, writing in the Worker under the title "What Does It All Mean?",
noted that
"For some reason or other, not yet explained, the coal
proprietors, in conjunction with the Federal Government,
are deeply concerned lest the miners should lose a single
day's work ...
(The miners) do see huge stacks of coal at every available
point of assembly in close proximity to the Railways ...
They are told that the Empire depends on them, and the
coal they hew from below the surface. And then they turn
to the huge stacks lying at grass and wonder why it is,
if the Empire needs this coal so badly, it is not going
Empire-wards". 13
The charge was a valid one. By using these existing stacks of coal,
the Commissioners were able to keep rail services operating even though
limited.

The abundance of coal available to the Government also put the

miners in a weak tactical position during the strike.
Commenting on the passage of the amended Unlawful Associations Act,
Boote noted the following:
"I am absolutely convinced that the Unlawful Associations
Bill is brought forward with the sinister object of having
available a Coercion Act that can be used to crush out of
existence any organised body opposed to the ruling and purpose
of the Government.
The amendment secured by the Labor Party, to the effect that
the measure shall not apply to Unions registered under the
laws, affords a certain degree of protection —
... during the period of the war a capitalist-dominated
government could always find a pretext for de-registration
in time of industrial trouble, when mines might be abandoned
or crops left iingathered, and when allegations of injury to
property and of danger 1D scabworkers are almost invariably
made. This measure could then be applied, and the Union or
Unions concerned be declared unlawful, and the strikers
brought under the harrow of coercion. ... Let the labovir
organisations make no mistake about it - there is mischief
brewing in Billy's pot..." 14
13.
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Boote's observations could be dismissed as mere labour fantasies, yet
they were so prophetic.

The comments were particularly pertinent

because of the nature of the circumstances that existed at this time.
With unemployment relatively high, the Government had, in time of
emergency, a potential source of volunteer labour.

Mr. Buckley, M.L.A.,

speaking in the Legistlative Assembly, strengthened Boote's fears:
"... we take strong exception to the economic conscription
that is now being introduced. Unemployment is rampant,
and no single men can obtain positions in the Tramway or
Railway Departments. The railway service is about to
dismiss all single men, and in view of the dearth of
emplojmient, it will be impossible for single men to
exist unless they enlist". 15
The mention of unemployment, and economic conscription is important, for
it raised another issue which some Labor members felt was the real motive
for the Nationalists provoking the Strike.
The fear of conscription was very real within the labour meovement
and it was apparent to many that there may have been some connection
between the Strike and another attempt by the Nationalists to introduce
conscription.

Mr. McGirr, M.L.A., alleged that "behind it (the Strike)

is a desire to break up the industrial machine so that conscription may
-1 r^

be foisted upon the manhood of this country".

The Annual Report of the

P.L.L. Executive, published in December 1917, had the following to say
about the Strike:

15.
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"Every siobsequent step proved that the plausible ActingPremier, Mr. Fuller, was simply a willing tool in the
hands of the Employers' Federation which met daily to
advise the Government. That the Government and the
employers' organisations were all parties to a conspiracy
to break the power of unionism and force conscription
upon the working-class has been proved up to the hilt
by the discovery of the Secret Memorandimi prepared by
Premier Holman, and circulated among his colleagues
prior to his departure for Great Britain". 17
The Secret Memorandum mentioned was a startling document.

It was compiled

by Holman in February 1917, and publicly released in December 1917 on the
eve of the second conscription referendum by opponents of the measure. It
reviewed possible methods of improving recruitment:
"A census should be taken of the whole of the men employed
by the Railway Commissioners on duplication. Those who
are unmarried and of military age should be dismissed not necessarily simultaneously.
Arrangement should be made for them to be interviewed by
recruiting sergeants, or preferably other recruiting agents.
(He then suggested this course be applied to other
Government departments.)
... Most important. The employers of the State should
be got together. They should be asked each to consider:
1. How far single men of military age can be replaced
by married men and men over military age.
2. How they can be replaced by young men and boys.
3. How far they can be replaced by women.
4. How far they can be dispensed with altogether.
The industries of this State should be reorganised upon
this footing. When this is done, the employers should
be invited to, as far as possible, dispense with men who
ought to be defending the country."18
Holman admitted to being the author of the memorandum, but stressed it
was only intended to provide a few ideas for discussion in Cabinet and
the suggestions had never been implemented.

19
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to Buckley's claims that the Government was forcing economic conscription
on the workers, and in view of the events during the strike and the
victimisation of unionists after the Strike, it was not surprising
that a number of labour men saw the Strike as the result of a conspiracy
to discredit and destroy the labour movement to pave the way for another
conscription referendum.

Both Hughes and Holman had, earlier in the

year, promised that they would not seek another referendum:
"The Government does not contemplate reviewing the
Conscription verdict or disturbing it ..."
(Hughes, March 1917)
"We declare that the issue of conscription, having been
referred to the people of Australia, and decided by them
in the negative, is settled. We accept unreservedly the
verdict of the people,and will give no support to any
endeavour to again raise the question". 20
(Holman, March 1917)
It is possible that Hughes was under some pressure from Britain to provide
more reinforcement s for the Western Front where losses had been high and
21
for this reason tried to introduce conscription again.
Nevertheless,
the connection between the Strike and conscription was reinforced, at least
in the eyes of many in the labour movement. The Worker, under the title
"We Told You So", re-affirmed this connection when it pointed out the
steps that had led to the second referendum:
"1.
2.

3.

on the plea of economy, thousands of men were dismissed
from the Government works all over the country,
a strike was provoked in the ranks of the most loyal
workers for the express purpose of making the industrial
chaos as disastrous as possible, and of setting the men
to fighting among themselves,
then, right on the heels of the Government's industrial
victory, is introduced the second referendum battle". 22
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Evatt doubted that there was ever
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If the Nationalists had hoped to gain some political capital at the expense
of the labour movement during the Strike, for the purpose of committing
voters to a "Yes" vote in the referendum, they were to be disappointed.
The measure was defeated more soundly than before.
While such evidence exists which is damaging to the Nationalist
Government of New South Wales, the Federal Nationalist Government and the
various employer organisations, it is difficult to tie them together in the
form of a conspiracy, suggested by members of the labour movement. Apart
from the obvious emotive considerations and the political potency to be had
from the issue, too many connections remained tenuous, and could be explained
by coincidence.

Childe claimed that the problem with the labour case was

23
that it tried to prove too much.
This is probably the case, but it
should be remembered that Childe did not have the advantage of reading the
findings of the Royal Commission under Mr. Justice Edmunds. It is true
that the latter found there was "no reasonable foundation for the charge
of conspiracy between the Commissioner and the Government to ignore the
24
Terms of Settlement", but he did find it necessary to qualify this on a
number of points.

He found that several promises made to loyalists were

illegal, that the government had "exceeded its rights in some matters,
had violated the Terms of Settlement", had "suppressed the truth".

25

To make the final commitment to calling the strike a conspiracy between
these groups is perhaps historically untenable, McQueen notwithstanding.
What is tenable is that once the strike occurred, the Government of New
South Wales, with the support of Hughes and the employers, decided on a
show-down with the labour movement. With factors favouring them, they

23.

Childe, op. cit. p.164

24.

Edmunds Commission, p.lxx

25.

ibid, p.lxxxiv
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could easily win. The Nationalists no doubt saw that there was political
capital to be gained from the strike, and it is likely that the strike
added to (or confirmed) their decision to hold a second referendum.

The

alliance of thought between these conservative elements in Australia would
ensure their mutual co-operation in any crisis involving the labour
movement.

No doubt a desire for revenge for the defeat of the first

Conscription Referendum, and a continuing committment to winning the
war bound these groups to a course of common action and hence a total
victory in the 1917 strike.
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APPENDIX A
Revenue in the Railways and Tramways Services
(The amount of revenue available in the Service at the end of each
financial year after the calculation of expenditure.)

Year

Railways
£

Tramways
£

Total
£

1913

185,904
Surplus

32,455
Defecit

154,448
Surplus

1914

209,357
Surplus

1,680
Surplus

211,047
Surplus

407,217

1915

23,311
Defecit

90,135
Surplus

66,804
Surplus

182,397

1916

223,749
Defecit

86,292
Surplus

137,457
Defecit

615,005

1917

394,054
Defecit

18,189
Defecit

412,253
Defecit

440,220

1918

28,916
Defecit

40,835
Surplus

11,919
Surplus

216,330

Advances etc."
£

* The column represents total expenditure costs related to concessions,
advances of pay, and associated costs.
Interest Payments

Year

Railways
£

Tramways
£

1914

2,123,054

263,451

2,386,505

1915

2,328,580

284,539

2,613,319

1916

2,568,659

302,586

2,871,345

1917

2,858,789

335,361

3,194,150

1918

3,043,349

348,546

3,391,895

Total
£
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The hugh increases in interest payments adversely affected the revenue
of the department and was the single largest item of expenditure.

General

costs increased largely due to the abnormal conditions of drought and war
in the 1914-1915 period, the cost of munitions work in the Eveleigh and
Randwick workshops in 1916, and theCoal Strike of 1916 which forced up
the price of coal.

Higher pay awards and advances also contributed to

increasing costs. The surplus experienced in 1918, after defecits in
1915 and 1917, was largely due to the reduction of working costs during
the strike (fewer trains and trams ran, and the wages bill was reduced
by more than half,lower pay awards and advances, and the increase in
rates and fares.

The surplus cannot be solely attributed to the intro-

duction of the Card System into the workshops.

(These tables were compiled from data presented in the "Reports of the
Chief Commissioner" (N.S.W. Government Railways and Tramways) N.S.W.
Parliamentary Papers, 1914-1918).

57.
APPENDIX E

Slow Work

YEAR
(ENDED JUNE 30)

AVERAGE NUMBER
OF STAFF

TOTAL TRAIN
MILES

TRAIN MILES
PER MAN

1906

13,043

11,853,683

909

1908

14,891

14,251,052

957

1910

17,577

15,458,026

880

1912

20,915

18,521,320

885

1914

25,662

20,549,695

801

1915

25,500

20,420,023

800

1916

26,535

21,556,034

812

_ ,_ ,.

Mr. Fraser attributed the lower work rate recorded to four causes:
1.

misdirected effort (some work was done twice over)

2.

basic mistakes which stop things moving and cause idleness

3. men being brought on duty too early and left on too long
4.

deliberate slow work

(These figures are quoted from a paper presented by Mr. J. Fraser, Chief
Commissioner, piiblished in the N.S.W. Railway and Tramway Budget, March 1.
1917).
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APPENDIX C.

The Card System
Extracts from the report of a Commission sent by the South Australian
Government to inquire into the System of working in the N.S.W. Railway
Workshops.

This took place before the Card System was introduced in the

Railway workshops at Randwick.

Taken from a statement by Senator O'Keefe,

Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, VIII, George V, Vol. LXXXIII (2nd
Session) pp. 2424-2425.
Senator O'Keefe: "... Major Smeaton, a well-known member of the
South Australian Parliament, who was chairman of the Commission, asked
'You have apparently a very perfect system of control. Now, in huge
workshops such as you have, there are bound to be leakages somewhere.
We would be glad if you would, for our benefit and the benefit of our
own State, tell us where you look for those leakages; leakages which mean
uneconomy, loss of time, loss of value through spoilt material?'
The following answer was given by Mr. Lucy, the Chief Mechanical
Engineer of the Eveleigh Workshops 'So far as concerns the leakage from slow working, loss of time of any
description, we discover by keeping a good system of accounts where the
leakage occurs. We compare one leading hand, or chargement, and a gang
of fifteen or twenty, with another gang of the same number doing precisely
the same work under similar conditions, and hold the leading hand, or
chargeman, responsible for the output.

In that way we are able to discover

eventually the individuals to whom this lack of effort can be applied,
and we deal with them.'
In the light of this evidence, was there any necessity for the
introduction of the Card System in the railway workshops in New South
Wales, especially in view of the fact that the Railways Commissioners had
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been warned that any attempt in that direction would lead to a vast
industrial upheaval?

The report continues -

•With regard to the wastage or loss of materials, we have a system
of watchmen and a system of detectives; also, by means of assays of
castings made in the brass foundry and various other castings which
contain such valuable metals as tin and copper, and less valuable
metals, such as spelter and lead, we determine, by the amount of assay,
the total castings coming out which contain such-and-such a proportion
of tin, and we say, "Where is the tin consumed during the month gone to?"
"What is the percentage of waste or losses?" In that way we can check
any leakage.'
'What is the result of all this care?

Do you really check wastage

and reduce to a percentage basis the loss on what you think you ought
to achieve from all your work and that which you get?' - Yes.
Do you think, taking the whole of your operations, that you are
getting an efficient return for yoixr expenditure? - Oh, yes. I am quite
confident of that; the leakage is small.
You think that through the system of control you have the constant
oversight of the superior officers, and under them the foremen, you are
getting the full retixrn for the i?ates paid to the men? - Coupled with
the system we have of issue from the stores stock and return to stores,
both the raw materials in their unmixed conditions, forged conditions,
and finished conditions, the disparity of losses is further reduced to
a minimum.
Mr. J. Gunn, a member of the Commission, asked, "Do you consider
that you get as efficient service from the workmen employed in the
Government workshops as private enterprise gets from employees in their
own shops?"
Mr. Lucie - I do.
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APPENDIX D.
Unions Involved in the Card System
The Unions which met on the 30th July to appoint a deputation to the
Commissioners to review the Card System, and sho decided on the ultimatum
were as follows:
Amalgamated Society of Engineers
Australasian Society of Engineers
Federated Society of Makers and Repairers of Iron and Steel Boilers,
Vessels, Tanks, etc.
Blacksmiths' Society of Australasia
Electrical Trades Union of N.S.W.
Operative Plumbers' Society of New South Wales
Amalgamated Sheet Metal Workers' Society of New South Wales
New South Wales Government Tramway Employees' Union
The New South Wales Amalgamated Railway and Tramway Service Association
Federated Moulders' (Metal) Union of Australasia (N.S.W. Division)
Amalgamated Society of Carpenters and Joiners
Sydney Progressive Society of Carpenters and Joiners
Amalgamated Timber Workers' Union of Australia, N.S.W. Branch
Federated Ironworkers, Coachmakers, and Metal Polishers

(From J.B. Holme, The N.S.W. Strike Crisis, 1917, p.5a)
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APPENDIX E
Price Levels
N.B. Figures are in shillings and pence

Year

Food S Groceries

Rents

Combined Rents, Food, etc.

National

N.S.W. 1 National

N.S.W.

National

N.S.W.

1911

20

0

19

9

20 0

21 0

20 0

20 7

1914

22

11

23

1

22 8

25 7

22 10

24 1

1915

28

4

27

11

21 7

24 5

25 7

25 5

1916

29

11

30

5

21 7

24 3

26 6

27 10

1917

29 5

22 0

24 3

26

28

30 10

4

1

»'«The figures provided are weighted averages.

The figures for N.S.W. are shown because prices were so much higher in
that State and because the strike occurred mainly in N.S.W.

(Compiled from data in the N.S.W. Industrial Gazette, Vol. XIII, No. 3,
1918).
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APPENDIX F

Wages, Prices, Real Wages

YEAR

MONEY
WAGES

COST OF
LIVING

REAL
WAGES

1911

1000

1000

1000

1000

1912

1051

1101

955

945

1913

1075

1104

975

970

1914

1081

1140

948

912

1915

1092

1278

854

813

1915

1144

1324

864

854

1917

1226

1318

930

907

REAL
WAGES
(Adjusted for
Unemployment)

(From the Commonwealth Labour Report Nos. 2, 14) These figures are
adapted from those quoted in I. Turner, Industrial Labour and Politics
(Canberra, 1965) p. 252.
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APPENDIX G

Unemployment

Unions
Year

Unemployed
Number Reporting

Membership
'000

'000

%

1911

160

68

3.2

4.7

1912

464

224

12.4

5.5

1913

455

251

16.1

6.5

1914

439

251

22.3

8.3

1915

455

273

25.7

9.3

1915

470

292

16.8

5.8

1917

459

297

20.3

7.1

It is significant that unemployment figures were much higher in the Eastern
States, especially in the first two quarters of 1917, which coincided with
labour claims of forced retrenchment or "economic conscription".

Unemploy-

ment reached its peak in 1917 in the fourth quarter (October to December)
at 7.4%.

(This is taken from the Labour and Industrial Branch Report No. 8,

July 1918, p.19, published by the Commonwealth Burear of Census and
Statistics).

(From the Commonwealth Labour Report Nos. 2,14)

These figures are adapted

from those quoted by I. Turner, Industrial Labour and Politics (Canberra,
1965) p.253)
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APPENDIX H
List of Unions De-Registered After the 1917 Strike

Industry

Applicants

Engineering

Minister for
Labour and
Industry

Amalgamated Society of
Engineers, N.S.W. District

Railway
Commissioners
for N.S.W.

N.S.W. Amalgamated Railway and Tramway Service
Association.

Railway and
Tramway

Employees
Union

Date of DeRegistration

13.9.17

23.8.17

N.S.W. Railway Traffic
Employees' Association
N.S.W. Government Tramway
Employees' Union
N.S.W. Locomotive Engine
Drivers, Firemen and
Cleaners Association
Carrington Coal and Coke
Shipping Union
Carters

Earp, Woodcock, Newcastle and District
Beveridge £ Co. Trolley Draymen and
Ltd. & Others
Carters' Union

Timber-yard
Employees

Earp, Woodcock, Amalgamated Timber
Beveridge & Co. Workers' Union of
Australia, N.S.W.
Ltd. S Others
Branch

Sugar
Workers

Colonial Sugar
Refining Co.
Ltd.

Pyrmont Sugar Works
Employees' Union

11.9.17

5.9.17

10.9.17

Carters

Master Carriers' Trolley Drajnnen and
Carters' Union of Sydney
Association of
and
Siiburbs
N.S.W.

5.9.17

Storemen

Drug Manufacturers Assoc.
& Others

Federated Storemen and
Packers' Union of Aust.,
N.S.W. Branch

10.9.17
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Industry

Applicants

Wood 6 Coal
Labourers

Warburton 6 Son, Wood and Coal Labourers'
and another
Union of N.S.W.

19.9.17

Coal Lumpers

Minister for
Labour and
Industry

Sydney Coal Lumpers'
Union

24.9.17

Engine
Drivers

Minister for
Labour and
Industry

Federated Engine
Drivers and Firemen's Association of
Australasia (Coast
District)

25.9.17

Labouring

Broken Hill
Pty. Ltd.

United Labourers'
Protective Society
of N.S.W.

28.9.17

Coke Workers

Broken Hill
Pty. Ltd.

Coke Workers'
Association of N.S.W.

28.9.17

Engineers

Broken Hill
Pty. Ltd.

Australasian Society
of Engineers

28.9.17

Ironworkers

Broken Hill
Pty. Ltd.

Federated Ironworkers'
Association of Aust.,
N.S.W. Branch.

28.9.17

Aerated
Waters, etc.

Schweppes Ltd.

Federated Liquor Trades
Employees' Union

27.9.17

Cold Storage

Sydney Ice
Skating Rink
and Cold Storage Co. Ltd.

The Cold Storage and
Ice Employees' Union

2.10.17

Gas Employees

Australian Gas
Light Company

Gas Employees' Union

17.9.17

Coachmakers

West Wheel Co.
Ltd.

Amalgamated Coachmakers
Railway Car and Wagon
Makers, and Wheelwrights'
Society of N.S.W.

21.9.17

Wool and Basil
Workers

Lupton £ Co.
and others

Wool and Basil Workers'
Association of N.S.W.

30.10.17

Employees
Union

Date of DeRegistration

76.

Industry

Applicants

Boilermakers

James Couston

Employees
Union
Newcastle Branch, No.4
of Boilermakers, £ c.
Workers of Australia

Date of DeRegistration
12.12.17

(Adapted from "A Calendar of Industrial Dislocations", N.S.W. Industrial
Gazette, Vol. XIII, No. 2, February, 1918, pp. 144-145)
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APPENDIX I

Terms of Settlement
Agreed to by the Unions' Defence Committee and Cabinet on the 8th
September, 1917.
1.

The Card System, as existing on 1st August, to be continued, and
at the end of three months a Royal Commission to be appointed to
enquire into and determine whether its operations are just or otherwise, and should be continued.

2.

In the operation of the card system every man shall, every day, have
the opportunity of inspecting and initialling his card relating to
the previous day's work.

3.

Unions to siibmit full lists of grievances to the Special Commissioner
for Conciliation appointed under the Industrial Arbitration Act, 1912.

4.

Such of the grievances as raise issues which fall within the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Arbitration are to be immediately
referred by or through the said Commissioner to the Court.

5.

Such of the grievances as raise issues which are not within the
jurisdiction of the Court are to be referred by the said Commissioner
to Cabinet, which will immediately amend the Industrial Arbitration
Acts so as to give the court jurisdiction over all matters which
are industrial, but not matters of business management.

5.

The Railway Commissioner is to have discretion in filling all
vacancies, but in making appointments prior to consideration is to be
given to the claims of applicants who were in the service of the
Commissioners on or before 1st August last.

7.

It is mutually understock that work shall be resumed without resentment, and employment offered without vindictiveness.

78.
They were formally adopted at mass meetings on the 10th September,
1917.

(From J.B. Holme, The N.S.W. Strike Crisis 1917, p.35a)
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APPENDIX J
Terms of Settlement re Coal Miners
Agreed to on the 2nd October, 1917.
1.

The members of the Coal Miners' Federation agree to work with loyal
workers, and to admit them to membership of the Federation if the
loyal workers so desire.

2.

Permits under the Amending Coal Mines Regulation Act in future are
to be issued only in cases of strike.

3.

The Government manager of each of the different collieries shall
have the right to select labour, but in reinstating the industry he
shall give prior consideration - subject to the claims of loyal
workers who desire to remain in the industry - to former employees.
In selecting labour, the manager shall not bar any man merely on
account of his being a unionist, or on account of his past connection
with unionism, or on account of old age, or on account of his
becoming a slow worker through any legitimate cause.

In individual

cases where the Government has reason to believe that these instructions have been violated, the Government undertakes to grant an
inquiry.
4.

In selecting employees in re-starting the mines, the management
shall show no unfair discrimination, and, siibject to the limitations
before prescribed, shall observe the rule "last to come, first to go".

5.

The orders made by Mr. Justice Edmunds are to stand during the
currency of the terms prescribed therein.

6.

Each colliery shall accept a board of conciliation, consisting of a
representative of the employees and a representative of the management,
to investigate and determine all minor matters of dispute.

In the

events of these representatives not being able to agree, any matter
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referred to them shall be settled by a district conciliation
commissioner, a separate commissioner to be appointed by the Government for the Newcastle district, the Maitland district, the Southern
district, and the Western district.

These conciliation committees

shall deal only with minor matters of dispute, and shall not alter
in any way the working conditions, the rates of pay, or hours of
employment which are prescribed for the industry as a whole.
7.

Any future dispute as to an alleged alteration of the established
customs of different collieries shall be referred to the local
conciliation committee. But the employees agree that matters relating
to the method of working the colliery shall be directed by the management , and in order to prevent constant minor stoppages of work, the
Miners' Federation agrees to impose and enforce penalties against
lodges which strike without reference of the matter in dispute to the
local conciliation committee.

8.

There shall also be a general conciliation committee for the coal
trade, consisting of three employees' representatives and three
representatives of mine proprietors. This committee shall deal with
disputes general to the industry as a whole, and in the event of its
being unable to agree on any matters referred to it by the Chief
Industrial Commissioner, one of the Industrial Judges shall be called
in to act as umpire. Both parties agree to forget past differences,
and try to establish the industry on the basis of conciliation and
arbitration.

9.

All dargs shall be removed, and miners will give such reasonable
output as they are capable of, but rules will be adopted to provide
for fair distribution of available skips.

10. All collieries shall be brought into work again as rapidly as possible.
The employees undertake that no discrimination will in future be shown
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in respect of any collieries, and the Government undertakes that as
many collieries as possible shall be worked.
11. The employees agree to hold a conference with representatives of the
Government inside six months to consider whether an arrangement can
be made to work a second shift on terms satisfactory to both parties.

CFrom J. B. Holme, The N.S.W. Strike Crisis, 1917, p.45a)
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